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A CONCEPTUAL HISTORY OF RECOGNITION IN BRITISH INTERNATIONAL LEGAL 
THOUGHT 
 
By MARTIN CLARK* 
 
ABSTRACT  
This article examines the development of the concept of recognition in the writings of 
British jurists. It first outlines methodologies of conceptual history as applied to 
international legal concepts, before examining four strands of development of the 
concept of recognition from the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth centuries. It shows 
how the concept of recognition moved from examining intra-European diplomatic 
disagreements, to a focus on Christianity, civilisation and progress that barred non-
European communities, to a late colonial-era emphasis on technicalities of government 
and territory, and eventually a state-centric account that normalised inferiority into 
difference, before emerging in the interwar period as a ‘basic concept’ of international 
law: intensely debated and closely tied to a range of political projects. The article 
concludes with reflections on why British thinking turns away from recognition in the 
1950s, as the decolonising world turns to a new international law and self-
determination. 
 
Keywords: conceptual history, recognition, British international law, colonialism, 
imperialism 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
A. Recognition and its contexts 
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which was generously supported by an Australian Research Council Australian Postgraduate 
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earlier and different form, in M Clark, ‘British Contributions to the Concept of Recognition 
during the Interwar Period: Williams, Baty and Lauterpacht’, in R McCorquodale and J-P 
Gauci (eds), British Influences on International Law 1915–2015 (Brill 2016) 110. Terms 
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and awkward anachronisms. This is perhaps an obvious point, particularly given the 
arguments I make here. But noting it is imperative because they are still invoked today — 
sometimes in newer, coded forms — but always in similar contexts and for similar purposes, 
sometimes without any sense of this history and at other times consciously appealing to it. 
All translations are my own unless otherwise indicated. All errors and omissions remain my 
own. Email: m.clark1@lse.ac.uk 
 In contemporary international law doctrine and teaching, recognition is explained by 
series of syllogisms, a doctrinal debate, and a set of now familiar case studies and 
examples.1 In its syllogistic form, recognition is the act whereby State A announces its 
official position about rights, obligations, status or capacity in general under 
international law, most commonly in relation to a state or government. In the case of 
recognition of states, State A recognises State B where State A announces that it 
officially recognises State B’s existence as a state. The practical effects of recognition 
are numerous: that State A will deal with legitimate representatives of State B to the 
exclusion of other claimants to that mantle; that cases decided by State B’s courts will 
be recognised as legitimate foreign judicial determinations in State A’s courts; and so 
on. As a question of theory, the central dilemma of recognition is its relationship with 
law: ‘Is recognition a question of law or diplomatic policy? What law, if any, governs 
the decision to grant or withhold recognition?’ It is often suggested that the 
‘declaratory’ and ‘constitutive’ schools of thought offer competing answers to these 
questions.2 For the declarativist, State A’s recognition of State B is a declaration that 
confirms State B’s existence. It is State B’s fulfilment of the criteria of statehood 
(whatever they might be) which makes it a state, not an official pronouncement by 
other members of the international community. This is the dominant theoretical 
understanding today.3 For the constitutivist, the recognition of State B — by both 
State A and other current members of the international community — is necessary for 
its legal existence as a state. Recognition does not just declare existing facts. It is the 
action which constitutes and creates State B’s statehood and membership of the 
international community. Finally, recognition’s illustrations are found in the 
statements of governments, the establishment of embassies, the signing of treaties, 
decisions of domestic and international courts and tribunals on questions of 
recognition, and declarations of the UN General Assembly on a polity’s membership 
status. ‘Exceptional’, ‘anomalous’ or ‘special’ cases of statelets, quasi-sovereigns and 
semi-dependent entities are raised to challenge and complicate these otherwise 
seemingly straightforward principles.  
 The histories, lives and worlds that shaped the development of competing 
ideas of recognition and their incidents are today firmly compressed.  But the 
syllogisms were not always in these forms, the illustrations not always encapsulations, 
and declarativism and constitutivism not always the labels. Like all legal ideas, the 
concept of recognition has an important contextual background, and one which is 
easily forgotten or flattened in the focus on the logics of doctrine. That history is 
especially important because recognition involves a difficult blend of political 
                                                 
1 In the Anglophone literature, see, among many others, J Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations 
(CUP 1987); C Warbrick, ‘Recognition of States’ (1992) 41 ICLQ 473; TD Grant, The Recognition of 
States: Law and Practice in Debate and Evolution (Praeger, 1999); S Talmon, Recognition of 
Governments in International Law (OUP 2001); S Talmon, ‘The Constitutive versus the Declaratory 
Theory of Recognition: Tertium Non Datur?’ (2004) 75 BYIL 101; M Shaw, International Law (CUP 
2008) ch 9; M Craven, ‘Statehood, Self-Determination and Recognition’ in Malcolm Evans (ed), 
International Law (3rd edn, OUP 2010) 203; J Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International 
Law (OUP 2012) ch 6; J Vidmar, ‘Explaining the Legal Effects of Recognition’ (2012) 61 ICLQ 361. 
2 Note that most commentators quickly complicate the division beyond these schools: see, eg, Grant, 
Recognition of States, ch 1. 
3 See International Law Association, ‘Recognition/Non-Recognition in International Law’ (ILA Report, 
United Nations, 2012). 
decisions and legal arguments. That blending provides one story in the immensely 
complicated history of changes in forms of political organisation and the interaction 
between political communities in the modern world. Within the broader history of 
international law, periods of upheaval and transition have always involved 
transformations in the entities that comprise the international order. The problem of 
transformation, today termed ‘recognition’, has always remained the same: how does 
an entity become part of the community beyond it, and who decides the criteria and 
judges its application? 
In moving beyond general histories of recognition as a diplomatic problem4 or 
accounts of its development within international institutions and various courts and 
tribunals,5 this article presents a new perspective on the development of recognition. 
This history is built from the juristic works of British international lawyers. It tracks 
the conceptual changes between their works, places those shifts within their contexts, 
and shows how the political projects of jurists and states were woven into the 
purportedly ‘logical’ analytic propositions of recognition doctrines. Understanding the 
origins of recognition is important and urgent because that history is not a gradual, 
scholarly clarification of neutral criteria of statehood, or a simple description of 
diplomatic interactions and the reception of new states into an unblemished family of 
nations. This history shows how recognition was used to establish hierarchies of 
political communities, facilitating the exploitation of those placed at the bottom by 
those who placed themselves at the top. Nowhere is this plainer than in the writings of 
British jurists shaping and reacting to the rise and fall of the British Empire. The study 
thus contributes to the ongoing project of understanding the complicated and often 
problematic foundations of modern international law.  
 
B. Conceptual histories of international law 
 
This article’s second, methodological contribution is to take up a conceptual history 
frame.6 Conceptual history examines the changing meanings, uses and contexts that 
shape the development of concepts, with a focus on their role in political and 
ideological debates within societies. Although ways of treating ideas, thought, 
philosophy, disciplines or intellectuals historically might be fairly termed ‘conceptual 
history’, today that specific formulation is most often directly associated with the 
                                                 
4 See, eg, M Fabry, Recognizing States: International Society and the Establishment of New States 
since 1776 (OUP 2010). 
5 See, eg, Dugard, Recognition and the United Nations; Grant, Recognition of States; Talmon, 
Recognition of Governments. 
6 The importance of engaging with historiography in constructing and writing international legal 
histories is explored in detail in ‘Ambivalences, Anxieties / Adaptations Advances: A Historiography 
Manifesto’ (Paper presented at Interest Group on the History of International Law, ‘Evaluating the 
“Turn to History” in International Law’, European Society of International Law 13th Annual 
Conference, Naples,  6 September 2017). 
 historical theories of Reinhart Koselleck.7 This article is guided by a Koselleckian 
mode of conceptual history. While a clear theory of this mode of historical work may 
be difficult if not impossible to articulate,8 several themes and methods can be 
discerned.9 It seeks to establish when an ordinary concept develops and emerges as a 
‘basic concept’. For Koselleck, concepts do not hold singular, unambiguous and clear 
meanings. Rather they hold multiple, controversial, contested meanings and 
connotations that accumulate as people use them to articulate or further political or 
social projects and ideals. When a concept becomes an ‘inescapable, irreplaceable part 
of the political and social vocabulary’ it may crystallise into a single term 
(‘revolution’, ‘democracy’), and become a basic concept: simultaneously fluid, 
complex, controversial and contested in its usage by a range of political and social 
actors.10 A working definition of this difficult idea of ‘basic concept’ is an essentially 
contested and debated idea that is indispensable for the thought, articulations and 
actions underlying a wide spectrum of political projects within a particular national 
community.  
 Conceptual histories aim to trace this transition to ‘basicness’ by examining 
when, how and why particular strands of meaning are added to, persist in, or are 
discarded from a concept. To do so, they focus on language and context, examining 
which meanings remain stable in or across time, which meanings are chosen or 
promoted over time, and what contexts might explain these choices. The archive to 
which these methods are applied begins with the works of ‘representative authors’: the 
‘classical’ texts of major philosophers, theologians, poets, legal and political theorists 
that use and debate the concepts examined. Scrutinising these major works reveals 
what Koselleck calls the ‘semantic fields’ of a concept: the conditions of possibility 
about what can be said, argued, understood and done at a particular time with that 
concept. Wider discussions in newspapers, periodicals, pamphlets, parliamentary 
debates, government sources, diaries, letters, and potentially dictionaries and 
                                                 
7 The major essay collections translated into English are R Koselleck, Futures Past: On the Semantics 
of Historical Time (K Tribe tr, Columbia University Press 1985); R Koselleck, The Practice of 
Conceptual History: Timing History, Spacing Concepts (TS Presner tr, Stanford University Press 2002). 
On the development of conceptual history, see, eg, M Richter, ‘Conceptual History (Begriffsgeschichte) 
and Political Theory’ (1986) 14 Political Theory 604; M Richter, ‘Begriffsgeschichte and the History of 
Ideas’ (1987) 48 Journal of the History of Ideas 247. The major, multi-volume ‘encyclopedia’ of 
conceptual histories is O Brunner, W Conze and R Koselleck (eds), Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe: 
Historisches Lexikon Zur Politisch-Sozialen Sprache in Deutschland (Klett-Cotta 1972–97). Note that 
‘Anerkennung’ (‘recognition’), even as a political/social concept, does not appear as an entry in the 
Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe, despite its importance for, eg, Fichte and Hegel’s thought. For an 
introduction to Koselleck’s life and work, see, eg, N Olsen, History in the Plural: An Introduction to the 
Work of Reinhart Koselleck (Berghahn, 2012); M Richter, The History of Political and Social Concepts: 
A Critical Introduction (OUP 1995). 
8 See J-W Müller, ‘On Conceptual History’ in DM McMahon and S Moyn (eds), Rethinking Modern 
European Intellectual History (OUP 2014) 74. 
9 For English translations of GG entries, see F-L Knemeyer, ‘Polizei’ (1980) 9 Economy and Society 
172; R Walther, ‘Economic Liberalism’ (1984) 13 Economy and Society 178. See also the recently 
translated prefaces: R Koselleck, ‘Introduction and Prefaces to the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe’ 
(2011) 6 Contributions to the History of Concepts 1. 
10 R Koselleck, ‘A Response to Comments on the Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe’ in H Lehmann and M 
Richter (eds), The Meaning of Historical Terms and Concepts: New Studies on Begriffsgeschichte 
(German Historical Institute 1996) 59, 64; Müller, ‘On Conceptual History’, 84. 
encyclopedias, can be used to explore the limits of these fields. Importantly, 
conceptual histories focus on single national-linguistic traditions and communities: the 
meanings, histories, connotations and modes of communicating a concept are likely to 
be specific to say, England, France or Germany, even where terms appear similar or 
translatable on their face.11  
 The political, social and intellectual context of a period is not just a 
background to conceptual change. Contexts condition and shape a concept’s various 
meanings and suggest the kinds of political projects, and the orderings, experiences 
and views of the world within those projects that a concept is used to describe and 
promote.12 The concrete ‘facts’ of history and language become relevant where a text 
uses, shapes, or is shaped by them.13 Facts and concepts do not necessarily change in 
synchronisation, but often at variable speeds: political realities might change faster 
than the ideas of the day, and conversely some conceptual innovations might appear 
before, or point towards, a future in which they could be realised.14 These variable 
speeds are contained in sub-periods of a hypothetical Sattelzeit (‘saddle time’) during 
which all basic concepts transition from ‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ forms, to operate in a 
new kind of historical time that allows them to describe actions and visions that 
change and re-make the world of the future—that is, to make political or social 
claims—rather than just describe the present. Drawing sub-periods within the 
Sattelzeit allows us to go beyond recording different meanings of words, concepts and 
their contexts, and to structure a set of thematic slices of time within which we can 
explore aspects of change and continuity in an episodic way.15  
 From all of these points, one useful general description of conceptual history 
is that it investigates four hypotheses about changes to a particular concept over time. 
The first is temporalisation: where, when and why do authors place a concept into a 
longer horizon of philosophical, historical or teleological development? The second is 
democratisation: where does the concept’s audiences expand and extend beyond small, 
elite political classes? The third is ideologisation: at what point can a concept be 
generalised, abstracted and made usable by political groups? The fourth is 
politicisation: how do various actors use the concept to further their political projects 
amidst social, regional and national rearrangements and upheavals driven by 
revolution, war, economic change, or any other historical factor.16 
This necessarily overbrief distillation of some approaches and methods of 
Koselleckian conceptual history should not be taken as a singular statement of what 
conceptual history is or must be. While that might be clear, it is worth emphasising for 
the purposes of this study. The aim of appreciating historical theory is not to construct 
a rigid set of requirements or demands without which we cannot do conceptual history. 
                                                 
11 See, eg, R Koselleck, ‘Linguistic Change and the History of Events’ (1989) 61 Journal of Modern 
History 649, 657–61. 
12 Koselleck, ‘Begriffsgeschichte and Social History’, 419. 
13 Koselleck, ‘Introduction and Prefaces’, 28. 
14 On which, see Koselleck, Practice of Conceptual History, chs 7 (‘Concepts of Historical Time and 
Social History’) and 10 (‘The Eighteenth Century as the Beginning of Modernity’). 
15 R Koselleck, ‘On the Need for Theory in the Discipline of History’ in Practice of Conceptual 
History, 1, 5. 
16 These hypotheses were proposed in M Richter, ‘Appreciating a Contemporary Classic’ in Meaning 
of Historical Terms and Concepts, 12. 
 Instead it serves as a set of deeper theoretical reflections for guidance through and 
adaptation to the methodological problems and difficulties of international legal 
history.17  
 What then might histories of concepts in international law look like? Given 
international law’s reliance on wide swathes of the world of political ideas and 
movements, and the facts of the world,18 several works in the history of international 
law have focused on concepts and ideas, though without adopting an explicit 
conceptual history methodology.19 Koskenniemi recently provided a short exploration 
of the enticing possibilities of conceptual history for international law, seeing it as a 
means of highlighting the ‘polemical character of the vocabularies’ of international 
legal arguments and their connection to political developments, and structuring a focus 
on polemical confrontations, the clash of opposing positions and approaching law in 
history ‘narrated as an aspect of political struggle’.20  
 While these useful suggestions remain faithful to the general tenets of 
conceptual history, conflicts in international legal writings, despite their clear political 
agendas, rarely reach the rhetorical levels of polemical engagement (at least, this 
seems to be generally true in British works). This is partly because during the wider 
period of transition from traditional to modern concepts, international lawyers are 
formulating a scientific, technical and expert vocabulary. Polemical engagements 
would be highly revealing, and perhaps they can be more easily identified in sources 
beyond juristic texts. But given the general absence of polemic in representative 
works, I suggest a close attention to language, doctrine and contexts are the aspects of 
conceptual historical methods most closely relevant to international law.  
 The purpose of a conceptual history of international law is to identify the 
move from traditional, descriptive concepts to a modern form capable of being used 
for a range of competing political projects and different articulations of visions of the 
future through law. An initial list of concepts that are essentially contested and 
controversial, but simultaneously central to articulating arguments through 
international law could be generated from the headings of any major modern textbook: 
‘sources’, ‘sovereignty’, ‘treaty’, ‘general principles’, and so on. ‘Recognition’ is 
perhaps now a basic concept par excellence: it is ordinarily introduced today by the 
supposedly diametric opposition of constitutivists and declarativists (and indeed, it is 
almost defined by that opposition), and it is perhaps more easily accepted as holding 
an important political dimension than other more traditionally ‘legal’ concepts in 
                                                 
17 See further Clark, ‘A Historiography Manifesto’. 
18 See, eg, M Koskenniemi, ‘International Law in the World of Ideas’ in J Crawford and M 
Koskenniemi (eds), Cambridge Companion to International Law (CUP 2012) 47. 
19 Among them, ED Dickinson, ‘Changing Concepts and the Doctrine of Incorporation’ (1932) 26 
AJIL 239; C Schmitt, The Nomos of the Earth in the International Law of the Jus Publicum Europaeum 
(Telos Press 2003); N Greenwood Onuf, ‘International Legal Order as an Idea’ (1979) 73 AJIL 244; C 
Ku, ‘The Concept of Res Communis in International Law’ (1990) 12 History of European Ideas 459; A 
Carty, ‘Myths of International Legal Order: Past and Present’ (1997) 10 Cambridge Review of 
International Affairs 3; E Benvenisti, ‘The Origins of the Concept of Belligerent Occupation’ (2008) 26 
Law and History Review 621. Schmitt’s Nomos of the Earth is perhaps the clearest example. Schmitt’s 
influence on Koselleck, incidentally, forms a significant link here: N Olsen, ‘Carl Schmitt, Reinhart 
Koselleck and the Foundations of History and Politics’ (2011) 37 History of European Ideas 197. 
20 M Koskenniemi, ‘A History of International Law Histories’ in B Fassbender and A Peters (eds), The 
Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law (OUP 2012) 943, 968–69. 
international law. While general conceptual history sees basic concepts becoming 
historical when they move beyond technical, professional or aristocratic vocabularies 
(democratisation), a difficulty for international law is that conceptual change—at least 
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries—is most clearly illustrated by usage 
within the professional community of international lawyers, academics, judges, state 
leaders, officials or international bureaucrats, rather than wider or popular usage or 
understandings.  
 To respond to these particularities of international legal ideas, I shift the 
balance towards a closer attention to juristic texts as the main sites of likely conceptual 
change. As with general conceptual history, we should look for stability in meanings 
and connotations over time, changes recognisable at specific times, and the accretion 
and discarding of meaning likely seen in doctrinal endorsements, modifications, 
disagreements or criticisms. The contexts for placing these texts are those of their 
authors (personal, intellectual, political), the projects and visions of international law 
and society these texts describe or promote, and the concrete factual events that they 
are shaped by or seek to interpret or influence: diplomatic interactions, disputes, wars, 
treaties, trade, congresses, imperialism, colonialism, and so on. The central question is 
what kinds of meanings and projects were—or seemed—thinkable and realisable 
within the boundaries of law and legal ideas at the time, and how these texts expand 
those meanings or further those projects. General conceptual history’s national-
linguistic strictures should be followed, but also for reasons of legal traditions. While 
cross-national conversations are common and important for the development of 
international law, many central building blocks of legal thought hold meanings and 
connotations specific to particular legal cultures (consider the widely different 
meanings of terms for law, right, justice, adjudication, constitution, state, international 
law, even within European traditions). Further, juristic texts have different forms, 
levels of authority, audiences and impact on practice depending upon the culture. 
Certainly, the dissemination, incorporation or resistance to ‘foreign’ legal ideas is 
important for conceptual history. But these interactions are best understood by 
examining their treatment in the texts of a particular national-linguistic legal tradition. 
As to time, as with general conceptual history the sub-periods should emphasise 
thematic changes in concepts, potentially overlapping, and be of sufficient length to 
allow the exploration of the frequently plural ways in which a concept transitions from 
traditional to modern forms. Here, I use ‘strands’ that link related jurists, projects and 
contexts that highlight different phases of changes in the concept of recognition. 
 Each of the Koselleckian theses noted above—temporalisation, 
democratisation, ideologisation, and politicisation—can be adapted to guide histories 
of international legal concepts. When might an international legal concept be placed 
into wider philosophical, historical or teleological narratives? When might it gain 
wider speakers and audiences beyond just the elite strata of jurists and state leaders? 
When might it be generalised or abstracted and then fitted into ideologies espoused by 
particular states or groups? And when might it become practical or usable for states or 
groups in articulating and pursuing political projects amidst the torrents of world 
history? After identifying the when, we may move to the how and why. 
 With these points on historiography in mind, this article proceeds as follows. 
Part II briefly notes the earliest reaches of recognition as a concept. Prior to the 
nineteenth century, recognition receives scant mention as a problem in English juristic 
works, and the first theories of recognition emerge in the writings of German jurists 
 around 1760–1830. Part III presents the first strand of emergence and development of 
the concept from 1800–80 and the articulation of a ‘traditional’ or descriptive concept 
of recognition. The first British writings on recognition appear most clearly in 
textbook treatments by Robert Phillimore, Travers Twiss and WE Hall in the 1850s–
80s. These texts present generalised criteria for recognition built from catalogues of 
intra-European diplomatic policies and strategies. This early concept stems almost 
solely from European concerns: either intra-European disputes over the status of new 
states, or stances towards European-style colonial entities in North and South America. 
Part IV examines a second strand from 1873–85 that emerges in James Lorimer’s 
heavily theoretical works which, significantly, placed recognition at the foundation of 
the law of nations. Lorimer articulates a chauvinist, civilisational account that 
responds to the encounter between non-European empires and budding international 
law. Lorimer’s work systematically integrates Christianity and civilisation into the 
concept of recognition to further his project of resisting the gradual, seemingly 
inexorable need to extend some form of recognition to the major imperial states of the 
Ottoman Empire, Japan and China. Part V considers a third strand from 1885–1914 
that moves recognition’s racialized aspects to imperial and colonial projects, 
commencing with the Berlin Conference of 1885 and illustrated in the works of Twiss 
and especially John Westlake. These works seek to sanitise the chauvinist elements in 
Lorimer’s thinking by shifting recognition’s focus to ostensibly ‘neutral’ legal ideas 
about government, representation, treaty-making, and territorial control. Texts by 
Westlake and Twiss on ‘primitive’ political communities that recognise their 
international personality only insofar as that recognition can facilitate colonial 
exploitation, introduce new meanings and connotations into the term. Lassa 
Oppenheim’s challenging new concept of recognition in 1905 purportedly removes the 
chauvinist superiority of European civilisation by shifting away from characteristics of 
states or civilisational characteristics towards a central emphasis on acceptance by 
current members of the society of nations, on whatever basis they choose. Part VI 
presents a final strand of 1915–50, exploring the contestation between concepts of 
recognition in the works of John Fischer Williams, Thomas Baty and Hersch 
Lauterpacht. Each of these jurists try to reconfigure recognition’s place in the new 
international system of the League of Nations, drawing on or rejecting ideas associated 
with the earlier strands of thinking and advancing new meanings tied to political and 
utopian projects. In doing so, they illustrate the emergence of recognition as a basic 
concept in international law. Part VII succinctly considers how writings of the 1950s 
reflect recognition’s status as a basic concept, and why, with the collapse of the British 
Empire and the shifting focus for recognition questions to the United Nations, the 
concept of recognition is no long a central frame for political projects of exclusion or 
marginalisation, as the decolonising world turns to a new international law and self-
determination. 
 
II. EARLIEST REACHES OF THE CONCEPT OF RECOGNITION 
 
There are several views of the emergence of recognition as a ‘problem’ of 
international law. One view emphasises legitimacy and authority, and locates 
recognition’s nascent form in papal recognitions of the fifteenth century; the Pope’s 
blessing of a Christian prince’s rule was a necessary and constitutive 
acknowledgement of his status as an independent member of the ‘club’ of Christian 
nations.21 During this time throughout Europe, a declaration of heresy or tyranny by 
the Pope could legitimise both external wars waged by neighbouring princes and the 
internal wars waged by a prince’s subjects who were no longer bound to recognise his 
claim to divine right: when papal use of this power threatened European peace, 
sovereigns and their jurists looked to alternative groundings of legitimacy, and a 
struggle between temporal (civil) and spiritual (papal) jurisdiction ensued.22 Another 
perspective focuses on the emergence of independence and sovereignty as 
characteristics of statehood. The 1581 declaration of independence by the Netherlands 
constituted, for Frowein, the first ‘important problem’ of recognition, eventually 
resolved only with formal Spanish recognition in 1648, with the Holy Roman 
Emperor, in the meantime, suggesting that full sovereignty for the Netherlands could 
only be granted by Spain.23 On either account, intra-European political struggles 
produce the early problems of recognition. 
 The first conceptual debates about the nature and meaning of recognition 
appear in German juristic writings of the 1760s onwards. In Alexandrowicz’s still-
valuable account, early works were prompted by waning papal and imperial authority 
and the rise of elective monarchies, and, later, the secession and independence of the 
United States, while later works responded to entrenchment of the Great Powers as the 
arbiters and interpreters of the criteria of recognition under the system grounded in the 
Congress of Vienna.24 Concepts of recognition in these works gain their meanings 
from attempts to debate, explain and justify various changes in states within Europe 
and their colonies and in the overall system of international relations in the Vienna 
period. German theorising was preoccupied with explaining the role of law in these 
diplomatic contests. Now that the ‘society of nations’ held unchallenged power to 
respond to mutual problems between the Great Powers through congresses and the 
evaluation of revolutions, secessions and new states, it became clear that membership 
of that society was paramount for international political efficacy. These earliest 
concepts of recognition are far from crystallised or ordered into a clear set of criteria 
or principles. They are often composed on the foundation of other international legal 
ideas: independence, sovereignty, equality, intervention, legitimate authority. And 
these concepts, in turn, are used without clear definitions, often illustrated through 
specific examples of secessions, interventions and revolutions. 
 While the works of jurists in the British Isles from the sixteenth century 
onwards are certainly steeped in these problems of recognition—papal authority, the 
structure of the Holy Roman Empire and other imperial polities, the independence of 
the Netherlands, the Peace of Westphalia, and so forth,25—the term ‘recognition’ 
                                                 
21 WG Grewe, The Epochs of International Law (De Gruyter 2000 [1984]) 75–82; HM Blix, 
‘Contemporary Aspects of Recognition’ (1970) 130 Recueil des Cours 587, 604ff. 
22 A Orford, International Authority and the Responsibility to Protect (CUP 2011) 140. 
23 See JA Frowein, ‘Transfer or Recognition of Sovereignty—Some Early Problems in Connection 
with Dependent Territories’ (1971) 65 AJIL 568. 
24 CH Alexandrowicz, ‘The Theory of Recognition in Fieri’ (1958) 34 BYIL 176. 
25 Perhaps best reflected in R Zouche, An Exposition of Fecial Law and Procedure, or of Law between 
Nations, and Questions Concerning the Same, Wherein Are Set Forth Matters Regarding Peace and 
War between Different Princes or Peoples, Derived from the Most Eminent Historical Jurists (TE 
Holland tr, Carnegie Institution 1911 [1650]). 
 appears only at brief moments and never within an extended theoretical treatment.26 
Alberico Gentili’s works of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, for 
example, contain several references to ‘recognising’ the right to send ambassadors 
inhering in lawful enemies, foreign laws, and various kingdoms and imperial 
sovereigns, and punishments due to rebellions against ‘recognised’ authority.27 Yet 
Gentili never treats recognition directly as a concept. The English text of John 
Selden’s Of the Dominion of the Seas does use the term ‘recognition’ explicitly, albeit 
in relation to French and Flemish ‘acknowledgements’ of England’s ‘sea dominion’,28 
rather than in relation to sovereignty, subjectivity or government, and without any 
extended discussion or explanation of his meaning. Richard Zouche’s major treatise of 
1650 contains a wider range of meanings of recognition more readily similar to 
today’s variety of uses—of the law of nations itself, of titles, of kings recognised by 
sending ambassadors, of the superiority of particular sovereigns or emperors, and of 
free peoples.29 Despite this wider range of uses, Zouche, like Gentili, uses these as 
brief illustrations of particular legal questions and disputes, and does not treat 
recognition itself as a concept in need of definition or direct consideration. 
 English works in the late eighteenth century, mostly written by the politician-
lawyers of the era, were more interested in questions of national policy than 
intellectual arguments on legal doctrine that preoccupied German jurists located within 
universities.30 The first volume of Blackstone’s Commentaries on the Laws of 
England of 1765, with its brief but influential considerations on the law of nations, 
mentions recognition at several points though in relation to the recognition of domestic 
sovereignty within English public law, rather than foreign sovereigns or states within 
the law of nations; for example that parliament ‘doth not, nor ever did, recognize any 
foreign power, as superior or equal to it in this kingdom’,31 and in relation to the 
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(titles); 19 (by ambassadors); 63, 64, 119 (free or independent peoples). 
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416, 431–39. 
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recognition of divine right in the monarch, eventually effected by parliament alone.32 
Jeremy Bentham’s ‘The Principles of International Law’, composed in the late 1780s 
and posthumously collated and published in the 1840s, notes that the refusal of 
recognition of ‘the right of a newly-formed government’ had been a ‘frequent cause of 
war’ and places it under the heading of foreign involvement in ‘intestine troubles’.33 
Bentham does not consider its meaning, despite lengthy examinations of the terms 
‘sovereignty’ and ‘dominion’.34 Ward’s 1795 history only mentions recognition 
briefly in relation to the recognition of royal rank and titles of dependent kingdoms 
within England and Spain.35 Sir James Mackintosh’s frequently re-issued and 
influential Discourse on the Study of the Law of Nature and Nations, which replicated 
the introductory lecture to his 1799 lectures on the law of nations, at Lincoln’s Inn, 
does not explicitly mention ‘recognition’ among a long and detailed (though not 
exhaustive) catalogue of the subjects to be covered in the series.36 
 
III. RECOGNITION AND DIPLOMACY: CATALOGUES OF EUROPEAN POLICY IN 
PHILLIMORE, TWISS AND HALL, 1800–80 
 
Perhaps ironically, Mackintosh’s parliamentary speech on Britain’s recognition policy 
towards the South American republics in 1824 was heavily influential in shaping 
doctrines of recognition used by a range of governments.37 This statement 
accompanied the presentation to Parliament of a petition by the merchants of the City 
of London, who sought to open trade with these new republics.38 In that speech 
Mackintosh insisted on two meanings of recognition: a ‘technical term of international 
law’ meaning the ‘explicit acknowledgement of the independence of a country by a 
state which formerly exercised sovereignty over it’, and virtual recognition, ‘not by 
formal stipulations or solemn declarations ... but by measures of practical policy, 
which imply that we acknowledge [the new state’s] independence’.39 While the 
speech is frequently cited in juristic works that articulate the first British concepts of 
recognition, these do not begin to appear until the mid-nineteenth century. 
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 Mackintosh’s language of explicit and virtual recognition is taken up by Phillimore 
and Hall in particular.  
 Within this first strand, recognition is initially described in diplomatic, 
descriptive ‘factual’ theories that rely on catalogued histories of intra-European 
diplomatic disagreements—the independence of the United States, newly-independent 
Spanish American Republics, Congress of Vienna-era disputes and independence 
movements in Belgium and Greece, and the US Civil War—and endorse British state 
practice and diplomatic statements largely uncritically. It is only in major textbooks 
from the 1850s onwards that recognition is treated as a distinct concept and given 
content largely through generalisations about similarities between various diplomatic 
incidents that are used to illustrate its meaning. Where non-European states are 
considered, they are not yet seen as posing a specific challenge for recognition, but 
rather are treated—often briefly—under the concept of statehood. 
 I describe the style of writing and argument in the texts examined in this Part 
as a ‘catalogue’. These works closely explore the factual detail of various incidents 
and changing policies, and draw strong links between recognition and intervention. 
And while they cite and draw on the German juristic writings noted above, and are 
likewise focused on intra-European diplomacy, they largely resist any speculative or 
systematic consideration of the nature of recognition itself. ‘Catalogue’ also echoes the 
important contextual point that during this time British writing on international law 
was far less systematic than its German-language predecessor-counterparts, owing to 
differing traditions of legal practice, the minor role played by university instruction 
and research in international law in the early decades of the nineteenth century, and the 
admixture of civil and common law traditions in British courts when dealing with 
questions of international law prior to the 1870s.40 
 
A. Early writings 
 
The barrister Frederick Eden’s (1784–1823) Historical Sketch presents the first brief 
examination of the concept of recognition in a British juristic text, and its first use in a 
polemical pamphlet. Published in 1823, citing inspiration from Mackintosh’s lectures, 
and dedicated mostly to using history to condemn the ‘outrages’ of Napoleonic France 
against the law of nations and purportedly ‘ancient’ principles of ‘international 
policy’,41 Eden’s work presents a British perspective on Congress-era recognition 
issues, read as debates over legitimism and intervention. He defends Britain’s refusal 
to sanction Austria, Russia and Prussia’s ‘Declaration in Favour of Legitimacy’ of 8 
December 1820, which asserted a general right of intervention against revolutionary 
movements they deemed a threat to European peace, and endorses this position by 
reference to the nature of recognition. He reads the Declaration as ‘resolv[ing] itself 
into a recognition of hereditary Succession upon the ancient footing, on which it 
existed in Europe, and a solemn protest against the opposite principles’.42 That use of 
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recognition, he urged, was ‘subversive of Public Law and of the independent existence 
of Nations’ because it justified foreign interventions and assistance to preserve ‘the 
power of Sovereigns at the expense of the just privileges of their subjects, and of that 
original and inherent right of resistance and self-defence’.43  
 Eden continues his castigation of the Alliance by examining several other 
meanings of recognition. The Alliance’s decision, following the Neapolitan and 
Spanish revolutions of 1820, to ‘refuse to recognize those reforms which were either 
adverse to the Monarchical Principle, or which did not emanate from Thrones’—that 
is, contrary to hereditary succession, or not granted by monarchs—established a 
purported right of intervention not to prevent actual danger but only to stop ‘the 
establishment of a form of government inconsistent with their own views and 
interests’.44 This use of recognition, urged Eden, was contrary to the ‘imprescriptible 
right’ of all nations to select their own constitutions, the changes to which would 
nonetheless not prevent states from maintaining the ‘usual relations of peace and 
amity’ or the ‘ancient federal maxims of the European Commonwealth’ that preserved 
independence regardless of national strength.45 This ‘unwise policy’, though it had not 
yet ‘corrupted’ Europe’s public law, threatened to undermine its system of federal 
relations ‘so essential to the security and happiness of mankind’.46 Eden concludes his 
Sketch with the mention of a new spectre: 
 
the wide diffusion of knowledge, and the constant communication among the European states, has not 
only given every Nation a clearer insight into her real interests, but has introduced a new principle in 
politics, unknown to ancient times, in the salutary and effectual controul [sic] which Public Opinion has 
long exercised even over the most ambitious and enterprising Princes.47 
 
 The foregoing, and this conclusion in particular, reinforces the central concern 
for Eden’s rather unsystematic set of views on recognition’s nature: that recognition 
should not be used as a tool of intervention into internal government changes, partly 
because European integration and peace relies on non-intervention, and because public 
opinion’s ‘effectual controul’ is increasingly curtailing the unilateral actions of 
monarchs through the demands of popular representation. Eden’s work was far less 
systematic than that of his German predecessors, and was not cited or discussed in 
later treatments. Nonetheless it is intriguing because it reflects a set of views about 
legal restrictions on recognition tied very closely to the international political projects 
of the day. 
 Despite the publication of new textbooks and treatises in Britain from the 
1830s–50s, in a (perhaps minor) ‘renaissance’ of international legal scholarship in 
Britain,48 these works devote no49 or minimal50 attention to recognition. These texts 
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 are mostly written by authors with doctoral qualifications who held membership of the 
Doctors Commons, teaching appointments in new university law programs, or 
government advisory posts. They tend to be directed not only at university audiences 
but also practitioners, the interested public, and, more importantly, statesmen dealing 
with international relations, to whom they were often dedicated.51 Despite treating a 
range of topics systematically, the few that do mention recognition at all make short 
general statements illustrated briefly by European diplomatic incidents. 
 The first holders of the new English chairs in international law—the Chichele 
at Oxford, held by Montague Bernard (1820–80) from 1859 and the Whewell at 
Cambridge, held by William Harcourt (1827–1904) from 1869—both wrote on 
belligerent recognition. Yet these works explored the difficulties arising from 
diplomatic practice during the US Civil War. They attempted to distil principles of 
recognition from that practice, rather than propose any systematic conceptual 
treatment of the concept. Bernard’s detailed history of Britain’s neutrality during the 
Civil War briefly considered the question of recognition of belligerency but focused 
closely on its application to the details of the conflict, with no sustained attempt to 
clarify or test a general meaning of recognition.52 Harcourt’s well-known letters to 
The Times under the pseudonym ‘Historicus’, published in the 1860s while he was still 
at the Bar in an attempt to educate the British public on questions of international law, 
are similarly practice-focused but are more revealing than Bernard’s brief 
consideration. In the preface to an 1863 collection of the letters, Harcourt explains that 
they ‘attempt to ascertain the true principles by which the recognition, on the part of 
foreign Governments, of insurgent communities, is governed’ and notes that on this 
question ‘but little precise information will be found in the ordinary text-books’.53 
What makes recognition such a difficult problem is the tension between law and 
policy, a distinction Harcourt wrote was vastly ‘important’ and yet very likely to 
‘confound’: in practice ‘[p]olicy might possibly suggest that which law nevertheless 
disallows [and] law might permit what policy, notwithstanding, would dissuade’.54 
For Harcourt, the legal principles governing recognition flow from the independence 
of sovereign states and the obligations of mutual respect for sovereignty, which he 
took to imply a right to the ‘obedience of subjects’ regardless of governmental type.55 
Consequently, dealing with insurgents ‘on a footing of independence’ is a hostile act 
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that violates the sovereign right of dominion.56 The question of when a subject ceases 
to be a subject ‘is a question of mixed law and fact’ lacking an easy solution, and 
general statements are of less use, he thinks, than detailed examinations of practice: 
‘The answer is to be looked for rather in the recent and approved practice of nations 
than in any definitions of text books’.57 Following a review of the instances of 
Belgium and Greece, cast as interventions, and Canning’s policy on the South 
American republics, seen as ‘true cases’ of recognition rather than interventions, 
Harcourt concludes that the ‘practical rule’ seems to be that when the mother state has 
‘virtually and substantially abandoned the struggle for supremacy’, it can no longer 
assert its right to complain when another state recognises the independence of the 
insurgents as established: ‘The true rule is that laid down in the old distich. Rebellion, 
until it has succeeded, is Treason; when it is successful, it becomes Independence. And 
thus the only real test of independence is final success’.58 Bernard and Harcourt’s 
works are not systematic treatments of the concept of recognition, but rather attempts 
to clarify confusions about its nature, prompted by political debates about whether 
Britain should recognise the Confederate States. Meanwhile, however, more 
theoretical illustrations of early theories of recognition appear in the texts of 
Phillimore, Twiss and Hall. 
 
B. Phillimore and Twiss 
 
Despite Phillimore’s political experience in both domestic and international matters, as 
well as his considerable legal learning,59 his Commentaries of the mid-1850s were 
criticised (by Harcourt) as an excessively long and ‘indiscriminate digest of opinions’ 
lacking any ‘scientific investigation of the principles and practice of international 
law’.60 Although this criticism is arguably well illustrated by Phillimore’s account of 
recognition, Phillimore’s treatment of recognition in volume 2 (1855) remains 
innovative and intriguing. It presents the first systematic articulation of the concept of 
recognition in a British international law treatise.  
 For Phillimore recognition is ‘closely connected’ to the topic of intervention. 
Its ‘usual meaning’ is ‘a kind of moral intervention by one State into the affairs of 
another’.61 Phillimore does not expand on precisely what he means by ‘moral’, but he 
seems to suggest the freedom of states to make their own decisions on the basis of 
policy (and possibly as a contrast to interventions based on legal arguments). He then 
turns in detail to a second meaning: recognition may also signify a mother country’s 
acknowledgement of a successful secession by a province and its attainment of 
independent statehood. Phillimore offers a long line of European historical 
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 examples—German and Spanish recognition of the Swiss cantons and the Netherlands 
in 1648, Spain’s recognition of Portugal in 1713, Britain’s recognition of the United 
States in 1783, and France’s recognition in 1815 of various kingdoms formerly 
conquered by Napoleon—that effectively involve the relinquishing of an imperial 
claim by a European state to a particular province.62 Recognition by third powers, 
however, is the more pressing topic. To Phillimore it arises in only three instances: 
where a nation acquires a new territory which it claims to have recognised as an 
‘integral part of her kingdom’; when a province claims independence and seeks 
admission as an independent community into international society; and where a 
governor of an independent state assumes a new title and claims recognition by other 
states of it.63 New acquisitions belong ‘more properly’ to questions of belligerency, 
neutrals and effects of war.64   
 Phillimore then focuses most closely on this second instance of revolutions, 
endorsing Mackintosh’s 1824 distinction and dividing recognition into the virtual and 
the formal. Virtual recognition is a third power decision to remain neutral but to 
recognise the commercial flag of the putative state and to appoint consuls to its ports. 
This is ‘a Recognition of [the putative state’s] de facto existence, fully justified, 
perhaps indeed imperatively enjoined, by the duties of the Third Power towards its 
own subjects’: that is, the third power should not frustrate its own subjects’ ability to 
trade, which was the impetus for Mackintosh’s speech on recognition.65 Over time, 
virtual recognition gives way to formal recognition, evidenced in sending ambassadors 
and entering into treaty relations with the new state. Before this ‘grave step’ can be 
taken, though, ‘two facts should occur’: the practical cessation of hostilities by the 
mother state, and, more substantively, the consolidation of the new state.66 
‘Consolidation’ here means the maintenance of diplomatic relations with other 
countries and the possession of ‘absolute bona fide’ independence as a separate 
kingdom. Independence does not require ‘perfect and undisturbed internal tranquillity’ 
but rather a government, acknowledged by the people it governs, that is ‘ready and 
able to acknowledge and prove its responsibility for their conduct when they come into 
contact with foreign nations’.67 The government’s representativeness or type is 
irrelevant: its ability to control or be held responsible for the conduct of its citizens 
overseas is what matters. Where this kind of government exists, the question of formal 
recognition ‘concerns the internal policy of other kingdoms’ and is not ‘a question of 
an International character’.68 Once these facts are known, then even the mother state’s 
refusal to recognise is no ‘legitimate bar to the complete and Formal Recognition of 
the new State by other communities of the world’.69 Phillimore moves to consider a 
range of instances of this within Europe and the Americas, dissecting and endorsing 
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the statements made in the 1820s by the British Ministers Mackintosh and Canning on 
the Spanish South American Republics.70 
 Sir Travers Twiss’s (1809–97) The Law of Nations Considered as 
Independent Political Communities (1861) also focused on European political changes 
in its description of the nature of the state and the role of recognition in the 
international community. Twiss was called to the bar in 1840, held the Drummond 
Chair in political economy at Oxford from 1842–7 and published extensively on 
European history, political economy and the progressive development of communities 
in Europe.71 He held a chair in International Law at King’s College from 1848–54, and 
was then appointed the Regius Professor of Civil Law at Oxford in 1855, holding the 
post until 1870.72 For Twiss, recognition is specifically recognition of a nation’s 
independent existence. 
 Whereas Phillimore did not cover recognition until the second of his three-
volume Commentaries, Twiss deals with it as a central concept in the early pages of 
his Law of Nations. After explaining his views of the nature of international law and 
its subjects and placing ‘the nation’ at the foundation of international law, Twiss ties 
his concept of recognition to the independence of the nation: independence and 
nationhood form the basis of membership of the international community.73 Contrary 
to the fixation on states, nations and the international community that Twiss perceives 
in the ancient authorities and Grotius, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel,74 Twiss defends 
his preference for nations and independence by drawing a close parallel between 
domestic and international aspects of polities and organisation in their general forms. 
Mimicking national societies, international society is simply ‘the most enlarged phase 
of Natural Society’ in which nations are collective and representative bodies that aim 
to hold ‘intercourse with other like Bodies of men through the medium of the State’.75 
Internal organisation is ‘immaterial’, provided that it acts to represent a nation’s 
citizens or subjects.76 And as in the domestic state, freedom and independence from 
others is necessary: at the international level ‘Independence is accordingly the 
fundamental element which imparts to a State the character of a Nation’.77  
 Twiss then moves to consider recognition as a procedure of membership. 
Admission to the fellowship of nations occurs either by ‘overt’ recognition of this 
independence by a public act by the ‘Established Powers’, or ‘tacit’ recognition in 
‘being allowed’ to become a contracting party to a treaty with those powers.78 
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 Rejecting Hobbes’ narrower view that independence is demonstrated by the ability to 
defend against external attacks, Twiss concludes instead that independence, absolute 
‘and not subject to qualification’ means the absence of any de jure dependence ‘upon 
any other State for its freedom of political action’. Consequently all nations are ‘Peers 
and Equals’ regardless the factual differences in power between them.79  
 For Twiss, it is the ‘quality of Independence’ that, upon its assertion by a 
nation, requires the recognition of other nations.80 Taking former dependencies as his 
main example, Twiss contends that when that body ‘seeks to hold international 
intercourse with other States, and claims to be received into the fellowship of Nations 
upon terms of equality and reciprocity with other nations’, then it first requires their 
recognition of its independence.81 Other nations remain free to grant or withhold that 
recognition, and Twiss foresees that each will do so on a prudential basis of weighing 
the relative ‘hostilities’ which a recognising state might incur from either the mother 
state or the new nation.82 Underlying this view of recognition is Twiss’s strong 
rejection of the relevance of internal constitutional orders or legitimacy standards for 
nationhood,83 and his rejection of Vattel’s ‘combining Sovereignty with Independence 
as the criteria of Nationality; for Sovereign States are not necessarily Nations, while 
States internationally independent are not always Sovereign Powers’.84 He also 
disapproves of the terminology of ‘semi-sovereign’ and prefers instead to couch 
examples of states under partial suzerainty (such as those within the Holy Roman 
Empire) to degrees of independence and protection rather than sovereignty: weaker 
states under arrangements of protection are dependent if they do not maintain separate 
relations with other states besides their protector. Twiss raises the ‘Native States of 
India’ as examples of protected dependent states, in that each acknowledges the 
supremacy of the British Government and none has any interaction with one another or 
foreign powers. 
 Both Phillimore and Twiss’s works and concepts concentrate on intra-
European and American recognition questions. Their publication dates also straddle 
the Crimean War (1853–6), which Russia lost to an alliance of Britain, France and the 
Ottoman Empire. The subsequent peace agreement, the Treaty of Paris (1856), 
significantly made the first ‘admission’ of the Ottoman Empire as a non-European 
power to the European system of international law, allowing it to ‘participate in the 
advantages of the Public Law of Europe’. Although the precise meaning and 
consequences of this admission remained debated, it was a significant pivot by the 
international legal system towards Europe’s periphery that could not be long ignored 
by jurists.85 Phillimore and Twiss, here and in successive editions, do not consider the 
engagement with non-European entities as relevant for their concepts of recognition. 
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They address the encounter with Europe’s periphery as a general question about the 
nature of states, rather than recognition. 
 In Phillimore’s volume 3 of 1857, the Ottoman Empire’s entry into the 
international community is acknowledged as ‘beyond all doubt’,86 but neither the 
second edition of 1871 nor the third edition of 1882 explicitly consider that entry in 
relation to recognition. Yet Phillimore perhaps makes some subtle amendments of 
acknowledgement. Both the 1871 and 1882 texts examine only intra-European 
questions of recognition, albeit with a stronger statement that internal systems of 
government, provided they do not threaten other states, are no concern of international 
law. Phillimore now begins, however, with a nod towards newly established states that 
might not adhere to international law: 
 
when a new State springs into being, and demands to be admitted into the great commonwealth of 
States, International Law requires that her political status be so far considered by other States, as to 
satisfy them that she is capable of discharging international obligations. The Recognition of the new by 
the old States signifies their conviction that she possesses such capacity.87 
 
At this point Phillimore reiterates recognition’s closeness with intervention as a ‘kind 
of moral intervention’. Whether or not this is a subtle reference to the Ottoman 
Empire’s recent admission, Phillimore clearly sees no need to ruminate further on the 
significance of new states ‘springing’ into being or to modify his idea of recognition, 
beyond mentioning this requirement of adherence to international law.  
 But whereas these developments do not bear on Phillimore’s concept of 
recognition, he treats them as relevant for his concept of the state.88 Noting that 
international law ‘has no concern’ with questions of internal government, religion, or 
the power of a state,89 Phillimore notes in his first volume of 1854 that eighteenth-
century treaties with African kingdoms evidenced that European states 
‘acknowledg[ed] and confirm[ed] to them the relations of legal communities’.90 He 
cites Lord Stowell’s view that while African notions of ‘international justice’ differ, 
European states would still treat these kingdoms as having the rights and duties of 
states, albeit sometimes requiring a ‘relaxed application’ of some principles of 
international law.91 This applies equally to the Ottoman Porte, which despite its 
diversity and inclusion of Christian nations (whose ‘origin, manners, and institutions’ 
and ‘above all’ religion distinguish and ‘eternally separate [them] from the Turk’92), 
had entered into extensive treaty relations with European states.93 Consequently, ‘the 
Porte must now be considered as subject, with only such exceptions as the reason of 
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 the thing may dictate, not only to the principles of general International Law, but to the 
particular provision of the European Code’.94 For Phillimore, then, the question of 
non-European states is germane to the nature of the state, evidenced by European 
interactions, rather than modes or problems of recognition. Where Phillimore seems to 
grapple briefly with a new (kind of) entity, the relevant meaning of recognition is 
simply that the new entity recognises the law of nations itself; that old states act as 
guardians of entry into the new order, the price of which is manifest adherence to the 
law of nations (at least in part). 
 Like Phillimore, Twiss does not regard the interaction between Christian and 
non-Christian powers as having a clear bearing on recognition as a concept, and he 
similarly examines the Ottoman Empire in his catalogue of different states (albeit in 
much more detail than Phillimore). Twiss’s 1861 edition contains comprehensive 
chapters on the ‘national state systems of Christendom’ and the international legal 
relations between Christendom and the ‘Mahommedan World’.95 Twiss reads the 
Treaty of Paris as evidencing the Ottoman Empire having ‘acquiesced in the 
declaration of its admission into the European Family of Nations’, and given its 
general move towards European diplomatic customs it, ‘for all practical purposes’ 
seems to have ‘adopted the Common Law of Europe’.96 Given the differences in 
‘manners and institutions’, however, treaty relations ‘will probably continue to be 
extremely anomalous’.97 After examining those relations, Twiss asserts that Christian 
principalities within the Ottoman Empire are of a different character both ‘politically 
and internationally’ because they retain some degrees of ‘National and administrative 
independence’ and various liberties.98 But rather than clarify the exact position of 
these bodies within international society (or any implications for his concept of 
recognition), Twiss devotes the remainder of that chapter to the Ottoman Empire’s 
internal constitutional arrangements,99 before turning to general sources and rights of 
international law. 
 
C. Hall and the ‘traditional’ concept 
 
William Edward Hall’s (1835–94) landmark treatise International Law (1880), 
published after the unification of Germany and Italy and the establishment of the Third 
French Republic, gives the clearest general expression of the concept of recognition, 
and perhaps the most influential and frequently cited formulation.100 Hall’s account of 
recognition reflects a modern conception of representative nation-states, and 
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crystallises the end-point of the first strand of British concepts of recognition as 
grounded in European-style state formation and diplomatic engagements. 
 Hall presents an image of the permanent state, a representative and 
changeable government, with an emphasis on the continuity and clarity of state 
obligations at international law separate from its internal political systems or changes. 
Hall’s state is neither described in terms of the idealised expectations of the European 
community nor justified through particular forms of legitimacy or justice, but is 
simply presented as a corporate personality, now ubiquitous in Europe. Hall uses the 
language of ‘international persons’ and defines this as entities that bear, in Bodin’s 
phrase, the ‘marks of a state’: exclusive control over persons and things within its 
territory, regulation of external conduct independent of the will of any other 
community and in conformity with international law, and giving other international 
persons ‘reason to expect’ it will exist permanently and sufficiently to ‘render it a 
person in law’.101 With a solidified distinction between state identity and government 
type, international law now looks solely to legal obligations and duties and pays no 
heed to internal changes in governments or constitutional forms, both of which are 
agents for the expression of community will that may be superseded at that 
community’s pleasure.102 
 Hall first considers recognition within his introductory chapter as a 
consequential problem of imperfections in international personality, with those 
imperfections most clearly apparent in cases of secession and intervention. 
Communities with ‘imperfect’ marks of states, such as a flaw in complete 
independence (the restraints of confederation or holding protectorate status103) may 
still be ‘admitted to the privilege of being subject to international law, in so far as they 
are capable of being brought within the scope of its operation’.104 Shifting towards the 
language of perfection/imperfection reflects the normality of states and the ways in 
which national political communities have gradually coalesced into nation-states. But 
this shift also suggests some acknowledgement of the variety of ways in which nation-
states may be (partly) dependent on other powers, and hence in some way imperfect. 
Hall’s examination of recognition is very much rooted in European secession 
questions. Belligerent secessions are read through the lens of independent statehood. 
Secessionist entities hold ‘a more complete momentary independence’ than 
confederate or protectorate states, and the uncertainty is not about the extent of 
imperfection but rather the time for which independence can be maintained. Because 
belligerent communities are not yet persons, they do not have rights under 
international law and cannot demand recognition. A third state, however, may 
recognise them if its interests are affected by the ongoing hostilities, as ‘a reasonable 
measure of self-protection’.105 Despite this focus, Hall’s work largely dispenses with 
the array of illustrative examples seen in earlier texts. These formerly novel legal 
quandaries are now widely known, and their difficulties have coalesced into a more 
solid set of legal principles. 
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  Hall conceptualises recognition as a right contingent on the marks of a state: 
‘[t]heoretically, a politically organised community enters of right ... into the family of 
states and must be treated in accordance with law, so soon as it is able to show that it 
possesses the marks of a state’.106 Nonetheless, ‘commencement’ of statehood begins 
only with recognition evidenced by the exchange of ambassadors, the conclusion of 
treaties, and so forth. Current states have no right to withhold recognition, but each is 
‘allowed to judge’ for itself if a community possesses all the necessary marks, and 
whether it is ‘likely to live’.107 Hall’s exploration of the concept fixates on what he 
calls the ‘general’ cause of a new state—secessionist entities coming ‘into existence 
by breaking off from an actually existing state’108—and the rights and duties of third 
powers. This kind of change is treated with an air of normalcy. Departing from earlier 
views, Hall proposes a new legal equivalency between the rights of parent states and 
third powers. Recognition by either does not give the ‘gift of independence’ but only 
acknowledges the existence of a claim to independence. This acknowledgement is a 
question of policy, and prudential concerns are paramount for all parties.109  
 Despite the importance of prudence and policy, Hall still asserts that ‘true 
principles’ of recognition exist: they are illustrated by British and United States 
practice in recognition of the South American republics, particularly the statements of 
Mackintosh and Canning which are endorsed and discussed in detail.110 In Hall’s 
reading, that practice supports the general principle that definitive independence is not 
established and recognition not legitimate if a ‘substantial struggle’ is ongoing.111 
Where the mother state’s struggle to retain control is ‘so inadequate’ that it provides 
no reasonable grounds for supposing that the mother state might actually regain 
control, that resistance ‘is not enough to keep alive the rights of the state [or] prevent 
foreign countries from falling under an obligation to recognise as a state the 
community claiming to have become one’.112 Hall concludes his thoughts on 
recognition, and turns back to the central concern of his text—rights and obligations 
under international law—examining these in relation to new states.113  
 Hall’s treatment of recognition reflects some settling and stability of the 
concept. He moves beyond the longer descriptive catalogues in Phillimore and Twiss 
to present relatively clear conceptual content based on now-generalised state practice, 
fixed on the problems of closest relevance to European powers: secessions. But Hall 
also makes a significant innovation beyond Phillimore and Twiss in acknowledging 
two new problems for recognition. These are dubbed as ‘rare instances’ and given 
brief mentions, but represent an important development. The first instance involves a 
state ‘artificially formed ... upon territory not previously belonging to a civilised 
power’ with the example of the company-established colony of Liberia noted but not 
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examined. The second is where ‘a state is brought by increasing civilisation within the 
realm of law’, for which no specific example is given.114 Hall does not return to either 
of these ‘rare’ instances, and while he does examine the admission of Turkey into the 
European system earlier in the work,115 this is briefly explained as occurring only on 
the basis of incontrovertible acceptance of European international law. He dispenses 
very quickly with the more problematic and philosophical quandaries of the nature of 
non-European powers and their attempts to join the society of nations, even as 
challenges to these ideas from communities in Africa, the Middle East and Asia are 
apparent. Similarly, he shies from Klüber’s interest in the difficulties of legitimacy and 
revolution, in favour of looking to solid state policy and practice to ground a clear 
statement of the principles underlying the concept of recognition. But despite the 
brevity of this treatment, Hall moves beyond Phillimore and Twiss to acknowledge 
that changes to international society through colonial states and the possibility of 
‘increasing civilisation’ leading to a demand for admission present discrete problems 
not, contra Phillimore and Twiss, for the idea of the state, but for recognition as a 
concept itself. As the next sections demonstrate, in the late nineteenth century the 
incidents treated as ‘rare’ by Hall have, to other jurists, been seen as far more pressing 
for thinking on recognition. 
 Within the first strand of its development, the concept of recognition is 
articulated in a ‘traditional’ form. It focuses on immediate factual propositions about 
whether or not an entity is independent, what role treaty or diplomatic relations have, 
and fixates on problems of central relevance to European powers. To return to the 
theses of conceptual history, there is not yet any real temporal orientation for the 
concept within broader philosophical, historical or teleological narratives (about, say, 
the development of communities), nor does it fit any particular ideological or political 
projects. Recognition concepts collect and distil European diplomatic practice, and, 
while the modern nation-state is a focus by 1880, the European polity and its forms of 
diplomatic interaction are not yet explicitly presented as the ideal to which others must 
adhere. Because the central problem is how to deal with new states born out of the ribs 
of known and recognised European states, recognition is not seen as a particularly 
difficult theoretical problem, but rather only a question of which acts of recognition 
are lawful and supported by facts of political control. While the Christian/non-
Christian and European/non-European dichotomies find some brief acknowledgement, 
these texts largely insulate the concept of recognition from those developments. The 
next two strands of conceptual change will, however, come to fixate on precisely this 
new reality, and in doing so move the concept of recognition towards longer horizons, 
wider audiences, and particular ideological and political projects. 
 
IV. RECOGNITION AND CHRISTIAN CIVILISATION: A NEW BASIS FOR A CHAUVINIST 
LAW OF NATIONS IN LORIMER, 1873–85 
 
With the Ottoman Empire’s formal admission into the European state system in 1856, 
civilisation and progress—read as Europeanness and Christianity—slowly emerged in 
new conceptualisations of many ideas in international law, and by the 1870s were 
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 central to the new international legal project. While the concordance between law of 
nations and natural law writings among seventeenth and eighteenth century English 
and British jurists sits, as in the rest of Europe, as a foundation for modern forms of 
international law thinking that emerge in the nineteenth century,116 the focus on intra-
European (and intra-Christian) disputes meant that Christianity as the basis for the law 
of nations did not require any in-depth analysis or defence in the earlier nineteenth-
century texts examined above.117 With new encounters and the co-option of non-
Christian powers representing non-European civilisation into the European family of 
nations, jurists began to reassert the purportedly Christian basis of international law 
and its mission of advancing European civilisation through law. The works of British 
jurists reflect the development of this trend towards resurgent religious elements in 
international law. Responding to the recent, strong tradition of positivist criticisms 
emerging from Bentham to Austin to Pollock, who contended that natural law lacked 
any real connection to law and gave religion a merely historical or marginal role in 
law’s content,118 some British jurists—chief among them James Lorimer—mixed 
elements of natural and positive law in their attempts to grapple with problems of 
international law.119  
 The link between Christianity, progress and international law was reinforced 
by the establishment of the Institut de Droit International in 1873. The Institut’s 
express objectives were to act as the ‘legal conscience of the civilized world’, in 
Bluntschli’s memorable phrase. In Koskenniemi’s view, international law became 
simultaneously bound to the specific histories of nations and peoples while also 
holding a universal essence: ‘national laws were but aspects or stages of the universal 
development of human society’, and the Institut’s task was to bring jurists to argue, 
agree on and write the law emerging from these nations.120 But another important goal 
was to spread this law over the world. Within two years of its establishment, in 1875, 
the Institut established a commission of its members to consider how international law 
might apply to the ‘nations of the east’, asking ‘whether there is any such radical 
difference between the creeds and notions of Oriental people compared with the 
Christian people of Europe, as to render it impossible for the Nations of Europe to 
admit the Nations of the East into the general community of International Law?’121 
This kind of project rested on the prevailing European belief that European states 
would act for the optimistic ideals of progress and civilisation. 
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 These aspects soon find their way into theories of recognition. The 
differentiation between the recognised and the unrecognised would come to be on the 
basis of civilisation.122 New articulations of the concept of recognition began to 
incorporate civilisational and Christian elements to respond to the ‘problem’ of the 
entrance of non-European political communities into the society of nations. 
International lawyers, united by a civilising mission, were no longer solely focused on 
intra-European norms of conduct. Newcomers needed to defer to and be subordinated 
to law—both international and domestic—in a European mode. Recognition’s 
question become one of finding Europeanness in different forms of political life and 
culture. With the reliance on relatively vague and contestable ideas like ‘civilisation’, 
‘Europeanness’ and ‘Christianity’ that held immense rhetorical, ideological and 
teleological content, international law texts of the late nineteenth century begin to 
articulate more theoretical, historical-progressive framings that reflect international 
law’s new global civilising mission of spreading European ideals across the world.  
 Several British jurists were at the forefront of this project, and prominent 
among them—particularly regarding the concept of recognition—was Lorimer. In 
Schmitt’s view, Lorimer contributed greatly to the formalisation of thinking about 
recognition and its criteria.123 While Schmitt’s own resentments towards Britain raise 
questions about parts of his polemic, this story is central to many later (and less-
controversial) works.124 Lorimer’s work most clearly connects the concept of 
recognition to the new project of progress in a Christian guise. He presents the first 
thoroughly theoretical account of recognition, placing it as the foundational concept of 
international law as a systemic whole. Ranging well beyond a fact-centred analysis 
seen in the diplomatic catalogues, Lorimer’s concept of recognition incorporates ideas 
of historical progress and a heavily racialised account of the constituent parts of 
international society. Whereas differences between earlier jurists on recognition might 
be seen as driven more by their individual emphases and readings of events, Lorimer 
introduces a radically different account of the nature, importance and centrality of the 
concept of recognition in international legal thought. It is also grounded much more in 
political projects of the day. His thought then represents, in the language of conceptual 
history, an important move towards a concept of recognition with a ‘progressive’ slant. 
Recognition is fitted into a longer horizon of philosophical, historical and teleological 
development, now capable of articulating political and ideological projects—it is the 
explicit means and measure for the promotion of Christianised, European international 
law for the good of benighted non-European peoples; at least, those that Lorimer 
thinks can be saved. 
 
A. Lorimer’s early works 
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 Despite laudatory death notices in the RGDIP, and scattered later acknowledgments of 
his importance,125 Lorimer was for much of the last century a largely forgotten figure. 
Interest in his work has only recently been revived.126 Lorimer was undoubtedly the 
most overtly theoretical or ‘speculative’ British international lawyer of the era.127 As a 
Scottish jurist teaching within a hybrid common and civil law jurisdiction, he was far 
more closely aligned with European thinking. With an eclectic education in chemistry, 
zoology and philosophy partly garnered from frequent visits to continental Europe, 
Lorimer was heavily influenced by the idealist philosophy of the German Friedrich 
Dahlmann128 and the Scot Sir William Hamilton, who had encouraged German 
idealism among many Scottish academics.129 His closest friends were several other 
original founders of the Institut de Droit International.130 He was sternly critical of 
‘chroniclers’ like Wheaton. Practical recordings of policies distracted from Lorimer’s 
real interest in absolute standards and universal laws derivable from reason, which he 
urged covered international law and made it a system discoverable—like the laws of 
chemistry or zoology—through scientific examination. These methods of scientific 
classification of natural laws, and application to legal and political questions, 
characterise his work. 
 Lorimer’s early works, appearing at the end of his unsuccessful career at the 
Bar in the early years of his professorship, laid out aristocratic criticisms of 
representative democracy that presage his later views on political communities and 
recognition.131 Arguing in particular against JS Mill’s far more influential views on 
representation, Lorimer defended ‘relative or proportional equality’: an essentially 
aristocratic, anti-egalitarian perspective based in Aristotle’s political philosophy. In 
1867, Lorimer wrote that ‘Human inequality is a fact of nature which society exhibits. 
Therefore: Our representative system must accept and conform itself to the fact of 
human inequality as socially exhibited’.132 Representative equality cannot be absolute 
or accorded regardless of ‘status’ but must be proportionate to the ‘positions and 
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qualities’ of those represented; their ‘real’ value.133 By 1872, Lorimer had 
incorporated these positions into his first treatise on natural law, The Institutes of Law, 
which grounded his view of positive law as a clarification and expression of a 
community’s rational will.134 The role for scientific jurisprudence is to study that will, 
which will ultimately reveal the ‘real value’ of a political community.  
 From the 1870s onwards, Lorimer begins to incorporate these ideas of relative 
inequality and the ‘real value’ of political communities into his early articulations of a 
concept of recognition.135 These writings are revealing because they focus much more 
closely on the events of the day than his more speculative treatise. Lorimer’s January 
1876 lecture, ‘Of the Denationalisation of Constantinople’ first articulates his view 
that the pressing problems of international law stemmed from errors in the concept of 
recognition, namely the inability of the current concept to grapple with the reality of 
inequality he saw as evident in nature. Considering the ‘Eastern Question’ (the 
declining authority of the Ottoman Empire and Russian expansionism in the Balkans 
in the 1870s136) Lorimer castigated the Great Powers’ decision in the Treaty of Paris 
to take ‘refuge in a fiction’ by recognising the ‘phantom State’ of the Sublime Porte: 
 
Incapable of transcending the concept of nationality, and sensible of their inadequacy of that conception 
when brought to bear on cosmopolitan interests, the Western powers took refuge in a fiction ... In the 
keeping of a phantom State, which was no longer subject to the changes and chances of mortality, it was 
hoped that Constantinople had been placed finally beyond the reach of mortal ambition. The Sublime 
Porte was accordingly admitted by acclamation into the family of European nations, and the Treaty of 
Paris pronounced him to be entitled to the rights and responsible for the duties which the laws of nations 
imposes on civilised States. Safe within the barrier of red-tape drawn around him by the Treaty, his 
independence was guaranteed to him by the doctrine of recognition, the Alpha and Omega of 
international law!137 
 
 This vivid and strongly polemical reaction shows Lorimer held recognition to 
be both the problem and solution to the Eastern Question. ‘[A]s expounded by nature 
and by history’ recognition is not absolute but instead conditional on a real 
‘autonomous existence’, and ‘before nature and history red-tape is powerless and 
treaties must bow’.138 The Great Powers’ error here was to apply an ‘absolute’ 
doctrine to ignore the ‘corpse’ of the Ottoman Empire that lacked what Lorimer saw at 
this point as the first condition of recognition; ‘autonomous existence’.139 Lorimer’s 
answer to the Eastern Question was the denationalisation of Constantinople, which 
would have then seemed an ambitious scheme for an international government and 
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 joint-occupation by European powers. This included a plan for joint colonial 
administration of the presently settled Turks that reflected Lorimer’s affinity for 
civilising missions: ‘I would make of the Turk all that a civilised man can ever make 
of a barbarian—namely, a pupil ... I would give up the farce of pretending that he was 
sui juris’.140  
 By the late 1870s, relative equality and real value were presented in general, 
systematic terms. Lorimer’s 1878 ‘Prolegomena to a Reasoned System of International 
Law’ applied Aristotle’s ideas on relative equality to the doctrine of recognition. This 
combination would be ‘fruitful’ and ‘indicates the theoretical solutions of many 
problems which have hitherto been regarded as insoluble’, namely that looking to the 
‘quality’ of state existence would allow smaller, protectorate and semi-barbarous states 
to gradually develop into full persons and thus practically realise the desirable spread 
of the law of nations across the world.141 With these foundations laid, Lorimer’s 
Institutes of the Law of Nations presented his grand vision for ‘assisting’ in ‘solving’ 
the seemingly insoluble problems of the law of nations by placing the system on its 
correct foundation of a true doctrine of recognition.  
 
B. Recognition in Lorimer: race and progress 
 
Lorimer defines international law as the ‘law of nature realised in the relations of 
separate nations’. It aims at the freedom of each nation, achieved by the reciprocal 
assertion and recognition of the ‘real powers’ of those nations.142 After a lengthy and 
somewhat polemical discussion of the works of ‘elder jurists’,143 Lorimer concludes 
that these thinkers placed too much emphasis on ‘false or partial’ analogies between 
states and human individuals.144 In contrast to both their works and those of 
contemporaries like Twiss (who placed national independence at the basis of 
international law), Lorimer grounds international law on interdependence and ‘ethnical 
groups’: ‘it is only when, by the action of historical and geographical factors, [ethnical 
groups] have crystallised into political bodies, that they come within the scope of a 
treatise on the law of nations’.145 This emphasis on ethnical groups rather than 
sovereigns or states is central to Lorimer’s methodology. Whereas in the Institutes of 
Law Lorimer had based his view of autonomy on human anthropology,146 in the 
Institutes of the Law of Nations he moves to ‘jural ethnology’, his own specifically 
legal formulation of the then-fashionable ‘science of races’.147 He took ethnology as 
the science most likely to greatly influence international politics and jurisprudence 
because it had ‘insensibly modified the old historical and geographical conceptions of 
nationality’, which in turn would ground new sciences of ‘comparative ethics, politics, 
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and jurisprudence’ that would greatly develop the positive law of nations.148 
Ethnology would be the science to discover the ‘facts’ upon which jurists could base 
their assessment of whether non-European political communities could attain 
recognition.  
 Because Lorimer saw differences of ‘ethnical will’ as the permanent factor 
causing political differences,149 the ultimate ‘international question’ was whether ‘we 
are entitled to confine recognition to those branches of alien races which consent to 
separate themselves from the rest, and, ostensibly or professedly, to accept our 
political conceptions’.150 With this stark conceptual innovation, Lorimer overtly gives 
recognition an ideological and political purpose. It is a concept that should be used to 
exclude communities that do not accept or demonstrate European-style government. 
And Lorimer assigns to this task directly to the jurist. Jurists must identify the ethical 
differences produced by these ethnical differences and thereby distinguish the 
‘universal ethical’ from the ‘local, even if permanent, ethnical elements which enter 
into every political and international problem’.151 Clarifying this absolute standard—
to be found in the ‘laws of our common nature’ but at present unrealised but realisable 
through ethnology)—would then allow jurists to evaluate whether a mass of ‘ethnical 
facts’ will entitle a particular group to international recognition.152 
 With this new project stated, Lorimer turns to the concept of recognition 
itself, beginning with the idea with which he has since become most closely 
associated;153 the concentric zones of humanity: 
 
As a political phenomenon, humanity, in its present condition, divides itself into three concentric zones 
or spheres—that of civilised humanity, that of barbarous humanity, and that of savage humanity. To 
these, whether arising from peculiarities of race or from various stages of development in the same race, 
belong, of right, at the hands of civilised nations, three stages of recognition ...154 
 
 Relative equality exists between the entities both within a circle and across the 
different circles; communities are ‘no more equal to each other, in the absolute sense, 
than their citizens are equal. They differ in powers, and consequently in rights; and the 
recognition which they are entitled to claim from each other is proportioned to their 
powers and rights’.155  
 The first sphere of plenary recognition corresponds to civilised humanity: all 
European states, their colonial dependencies provided they are ‘peopled by persons of 
European birth or descent’, and the states of the Americas that have gained 
independence. Lorimer thus maintains, as the general core, roughly the same intra-
European image of recognition that can be seen in Phillimore, Twiss and Hall. 
Attaining this highest stage of recognition involves a formal declaration, preceded by 
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 an ‘inductive process’ in which an entity satisfies itself that another ‘phenomenally 
presented to it, possess[es] a separate political existence’ by showing it can perform 
the duties of international existence and is thus entitled to the rights that ‘centre’ in 
that existence.156 But, departing from those earlier views, Lorimer strongly rejects this 
as an act of ‘courtesy’ or ‘comity’ that can be withheld: asserting recognition is a right 
and accepting it is a duty.157  
 Lorimer’s significant conceptual innovation lies in his introduction of the 
second and third spheres to create an image of concentric circles of recognition. Partial 
political recognition is extended to the barbarous civilisations: the Ottomans and the 
‘old historical States of Asia which have not become European dependencies’, 
including Persia, China, Siam and Japan. ‘[N]atural, or mere human’ recognition’ 
extends to the ‘residue of mankind’ divisible into progressive and non-progressive 
races; Lorimer presumably means, but does not explicitly name, the tribal 
communities of Africa, the Americas, Oceania and Asia. While the positive law of 
nations need not be applied to savages or barbarians, the tasks for jurists is to 
scientifically determine exactly which non-European communities come into 
international law, and to what partial extent.158 Turkey’s recognition was a premature 
‘bitter experience’,159 though Japan, in another ‘twenty years’ might progress 
sufficiently to raise the question whether it is ‘entitled’ to plenary political 
recognition.160  
 Position and progress through the spheres depends on the assessment of states 
in the ‘superior’ spheres.161 Jurists from these states are tasked with making this 
assessment by applying the ideas of rational will and jural capacity to the putative 
state.162 This process of assessment will furnish ‘maxims’ of recognition which 
prevents states from either ‘twist[ing]’ or sitting as the ‘absolute judges’ of both facts 
and law.163 Distilling the thus far ‘vague and often contradictory’ juristic efforts to 
conceptualise recognition,164 Lorimer states that recognition has two general 
requirements: 
 
In order to be entitled to recognition, a State must presumably possess; 
(a) The will to reciprocate the recognition which it demands. 
(b) The power to reciprocate the recognition which it demands.165 
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Recognition focuses on an assessment of the presumption that a community claiming 
recognition has the will and the power to reciprocate that recognition. The newcomer 
must present to the states from which it claims recognition ‘a reasonable presumption 
that it is able, as well as willing, to perform the duties incident to international 
existence’.166 Whether the presumption is reasonable, and whether the newcomer is 
willing and able to reciprocate recognition depends on whether it possesses the 
conditions required for ‘jural capacity’. Political communities based on ‘intolerant’ 
creeds are excluded from this presumption: religions that do not allow divine 
revelation to be tempered by secular knowledge (Judaism, Mahometanism and perhaps 
some forms of dogmatic Catholicism) and political creeds that place singular faith in 
either particular laws or law-making organs (absolutist monarchies, aggressive 
empires, republics based on the infallibility of ‘the people’, nihilists).167 Drawing on 
his earlier domestic articulation in the Institutes of Law, Lorimer defines ‘jural 
capacity’ as the presence in the subject of a will that ‘partakes of such a measure of 
relative freedom as will enable it to exhibit itself within the sphere which the existence 
of the subject assigns to it as real and ultimate power’.168 This rather convoluted 
formulation applies to states. A state holds jural capacity and reciprocating power (and 
thus entitlement to recognition) where it ‘possesses [a] will which, up to the limits 
imposed upon it by the other conditions of its own existence, it can freely realise in 
action’ evidenced by its ability to consent or contract, ‘just as a citizen in a 
corresponding position is entitled to the suffrage, or a person is entitled to buy, and to 
sell, and to marry’.169 
 Because the jural capacities of communities vary widely based on how well 
they represent the rational will of their peoples, the major task for jurists is to ascertain 
the relative value of different states throughout the world. Lorimer outlines in detail 
the kinds of considerations he takes to be relevant for this evaluation—territory, 
population size, material wealth, intellectual and moral capacities of citizens, the 
degree of ‘separateness’ (not, explicitly, independence)170 from other communities, 
internal freedom demonstrated by autonomy and autarchy—all ultimately indicating 
the presence or absence of a degree of rational will and a form of government capable 
of expressing the relative freedom of the state.171 Lorimer precludes barbarians, 
savages and undeveloped races from expressing any rational will because they are 
child-like, imbecilic, in pupillage to superior races, or criminals.172 But of those that 
have some degree of rational will and are capable of expressing relative freedom, their 
relative value lies in the influence they can ‘exert in determining the direction of 
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 international action’.173 By this Lorimer does not mean simply power over other 
states, but rather whether a particular state has a form of government best suited to its 
historical and worldly situation:174 ‘the most perfect government for a particular State 
will be that which places it, as it is, in the most perfect relation with the States by 
which it is recognised, as they are.’175 The tests to be applied to governments are 
similar to those applied to forms of the state: 
 
To what extent do they enable the State claiming recognition, by concentrating its whole rational will, to 
contract as a single individual? To what extent do they enable the State claiming recognition to satisfy 
the States from which recognition is claimed, that its apparent is coincident with its real rational will?176 
 
Lorimer’s ranking the governmental forms that best answer these questions accords 
with his preference for relative equality: constitutional monarchies that embrace the 
whole population and rank their citizens ‘as relatively or proportionally endowed with 
rational will’; constitutional republics resting on the rational will of the community; 
constitutional states that only partly embrace the rational will; non-constitutional states 
where rational will ‘finds expression’ only in the society’s ‘organic structure’; and, 
lastly, pseudo-despotic or pseudo-democratic states.177  
 Having laid out these principles, Lorimer turns finally to their application to 
the present world. Lorimer concedes that forcing states, particularly the Great Powers, 
to accept their actual relative rank involves a ‘[v]ery great difficulty’, but insists that 
the progress of international organisation and the freedom of smaller states depends on 
it.178 As between the Great Powers, the principle of absolute equality should be 
retained and ‘fortunately ... conflicts less flagrantly with fact than when applied to the 
relations between them and the lesser States’.179 As to smaller and new states, an 
international position reflecting their real value and importance must be assigned, and 
in the absence of an international legislature, executive and judiciary, this lies with 
current states.180 States can thus progress and retrogress in their relative positions, and 
retrogression or domestic challenges to its internal authority may lead to the 
withdrawal of recognition, or extinction altogether.181 Partial recognition can be 
accorded by states in a higher sphere to those in a lower one, with the degree of 
recognition reflecting a state’s progress towards civilised status. An important 
indicator for Lorimer is municipal law, evaluated by the presence of foreign or 
consular jurisdiction. While between civilised states the decisions of each others’ 
courts are recognised (absent differences on notions of ‘morality, or public policy’),182 
between civilised and semi-barbarous states recognition does not extend to municipal 
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law, and separate courts are needed to decide questions arising between foreign 
nationals of ‘civilised’ states, and between such nationals and the citizens of the semi-
barbarous state.183 In Lorimer’s evaluation, as of 1883, the Ottoman Empire, China 
and Japan had reached a ‘stage of progress’ midway between protected and 
recognised, such that a new descriptor ‘conjoined with the term recognition’ seemed 
appropriate.184 But the difficulty of generalising a possible adjective was the need for 
European powers to interfere with their internal government ‘so often called for on 
grounds of humanity’, meaning these states are ‘constantly relapsing into the position 
of protected States’.185 
 Lorimer concludes his lengthy articulation of the concept of recognition by 
suggesting that his ideas of relativity and recognition are in fact reflected in the current 
system of partial recognition. Perhaps surprisingly, given his racial chauvinism and 
dismissive evaluations of governmental capacity beyond Europe, he offers something 
close to a lament at European treatment of partially recognised states. Putting aside 
Turkey’s ‘technical recognition’, which makes it ‘anomalous’, Lorimer notes that no 
partially recognised state has been ‘permitted to take part in the counsels of civilised 
nations’, notwithstanding that their right to relative recognition is ‘incontestable’ on 
the basis of trading connections alone.186 In particular, he suggests that no ‘ground of 
absolute justice’ supports China’s exclusion from bringing ‘her standing grievances 
against us [that is, Britain] with reference to the opium trade to the notice of other 
nations’; a clear reference to the Opium Wars of 1839–60.187 Lorimer writes that as 
every European state receives China’s ambassadors, ‘why should a seat and a vote, if 
proportional voting were admitted, be denied to [those ambassadors] in diplomatic 
gatherings?’; given her status as the ‘greatest of all the Asiatic powers’, China ‘could 
not have been indifferent’ to the Berlin Congress of 1878 and was certainly at least an 
interested neutral in the British war in Afghanistan in 1879.188  
 Lorimer’s work significantly expanded the meanings and importance of the 
concept of recognition. It makes several radical innovations to the traditional concept 
of recognition depicted in the works of Phillimore, Twiss and Hall. First, he replaces 
the binary recognised/unrecognised with a three-tiered gradation of (to his mind) 
clearly divided spheres. This gradated recognition is expanded to cover all political 
communities, rather than just those with whom European sovereigns have diplomatic 
relations. Secondly, he introduces a range of new criteria as relevant for recognition: 
express examinations of ethno-racial characteristics of communities, a focus on the 
expression of the political will of a community, the will and ability to reciprocate 
recognition, and a range of impermissible political formations and creeds. Thirdly, 
Lorimer’s concept grants a central task to jurists as the investigators and arbiters of 
legal principles and factual realities, and the concept itself structures that enquiry 
entirely. Returning to the guiding hypotheses of conceptual history, Lorimer’s view of 
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 recognition takes on a clear temporalized, teleological and progressive element in its 
overarching claim that communities may move through the gradations by political 
development, and by looking to longer historical trends rather than merely recent intra-
European secessions and rebellions. It shifts and restricts the community of 
authoritative interlocutors to jurists alone, but expands their audience to the rest of the 
world’s polities. And it now holds more pronounced ideological and political tones, 
promoting inclusion and exclusion along ethno-racial lines, seeking to entrench 
aristocratic understandings of the state and international society, and attempting to 
give European political elites a language for dealing ‘justly’ with those non-European 
polities with whom they are increasingly intertwined. 
 Lorimer’s world is starting to deal with non-European polities more often, in 
closer and — in some cases— constant, stabilised contact. Overlaying that contact is a 
Christianised mission of progress that promotes particular forms of life and 
government. Lorimer’s concept of recognition not only makes diversity centrally 
relevant for its meaning, but categorises and structures differences between polities to 
create a teleology of progress towards European, Christian aristocratic states. 
Lorimer’s account goes beyond merely cataloguing diplomatic practice. It tasks 
international lawyers with debating and deciding what kinds of political bodies are 
capable of recognition at all. For Lorimer, the perceived clash of civilisations and the 
new diversity of frequently radical government types within Europe make this an 
urgent task. Lorimer’s concessions to partial recognition are a product of increased 
intercourse with the Ottoman Empire, the Chinese dynasties and Japan: regulating 
those interactions through law meant some measure of internal competency had to be 
granted to these states (with notable resistance from nations like Britain, who 
continued to refuse to recognise Ottoman competency). Lorimer’s work on recognition 
presents the clearest articulation of a new racially-charged Eurocentric basis, 
appearing just prior to late stage colonialism following the Berlin Conference, and just 
after the emergence of newly-unified nation-states within Europe — and the 
ascendancy of that form of political organisation. And while his ‘jural ethnology’ 
remains particularly repulsive today, it bears recalling that evolutionary approaches to 
analysing political communities and their interactions were far from uncommon in 
British writings at the time.189  
 
V. RECOGNITION AND COLONIALISM: CIVILISATIONAL SUPERIORITY SANITISED IN 
TWISS, WESTLAKE AND OPPENHEIM, 1885–1914 
 
Lorimer’s concept of recognition rarely gained much acceptance or support among 
other British jurists, and it is rarely cited favourably by them. Yet many aspects of his 
concept and worldview are consonant with the next phase of theorising on recognition, 
which had a more lasting influence. Whereas Lorimer attempted to make sense of how 
increasing connections between European and non-European powers should affect the 
principles of international law, writings after 1885—the year of the Berlin 
Conference—shift towards active projects of colonialism. These writings consolidate a 
more technical approach to recognition. They combine civilisational and Christian-
focused understandings of recognition with ideas of government, effective control and 
                                                 
189 See esp W Bagehot, Physics and Politics (6th edn, Kegan Paul, 1881); HS Maine, Village-
Communities in the East and West Six Lectures Delivered at Oxford (Murray 1895) (delivered in 1871). 
territorial sovereignty that stem from now-dominant European visions of nation-state 
organisation. With increasing treaty and consular interaction between European states 
and non-European political communities that were still seen as having very different 
levels of organisation and civilisation (from ‘Asiatic empires’ to ‘bands of savages’) 
the question of the status of these communities is no longer primarily about diplomatic 
processes of recognition. The mere signing of treaties or presence of extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, which would otherwise indicate at least partial satisfaction of the criteria 
for recognition, are not as important as levels of government, demonstrated 
‘civilisation’ or the ability to guarantee protection of the lives and rights of foreign 
citizens. Recognition is discussed and understood in the context of other doctrinal 
questions about territorial sovereignty, treaty connections, and government types with 
these ‘different’ civilisations of the East as well as the appropriation of ‘uncivilised’ 
regions. The speculative, metaphysical problems for European international law’s 
encounter with other forms of political life found in Lorimer are left to one side in 
favour of using international law to coordinate and justify colonial projects. By the 
time Oppenheim inaugurates a new positivist school of international legal thought, 
placing the state at the centre of international law to the exclusion of all other 
communities and persons and holding that a state becomes an international person 
solely through the process of recognition, the civilisational criterion is effectively 
muted and entrenched into the assumptions about what members of the international 
community can look like. This third strand of thinking about recognition involves a 
mixture of civilising mission with more technical and detailed legal analyses that 
incorporate other legal ideas used in the colonial division, control and expansion of 
Europe’s periphery. Chauvinist ideas of European civilisational superiority found in 
Lorimer are gradually mainstreamed and sanitised by a veneer of positive law. 
 
A. Twiss’s later works 
 
Following a scandal that resulted in him resigning the Regius Professorship and the 
office of Queen’s Advocate-General and retreating from public life in 1872, Twiss 
continued to publish on international legal issues. While he did not update the concept 
of recognition in later editions of his treatise, he did take a more detailed interest in the 
new changes in civilisation and contacts with Europe’s periphery already gestured to 
in the first edition of his treatise.190 These later works examined ideas of territory and 
sovereignty in the context of European–periphery contacts and colonial projects, and 
come to reflect his late views on recognition.  
 Twiss did not share Lorimer’s conviction that certain religious ‘creeds’ 
rendered polities ineligible for recognition, and took a rather more optimistic, 
conciliatory view of the interactions between Europe and non-European states. In an 
1876 article reporting on the Institut’s proceedings on whether the ‘radical difference 
between the creeds and notions of Oriental people’ precluded them from admission to 
the European international legal system, Twiss went as far as stating that, even before 
1856, the Ottoman Empire ‘from a Christian point of view ... had been already 
received as a Peer into the European Parliament of States’ because Ottoman 
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 ambassadors were admitted to reside at the courts of two European powers.191 Twiss 
identified a ‘growing desire [among] Mussulman Races to place themselves on the 
same platform of Public Law with the Christian Races of Europe’.192 Manifested 
adherence to that law was central to their legitimate statehood and their capacity for 
recognition. Specifically, that required Islamic states to renounce the ‘creed’ of jihad 
by concluding treaties of amity with European states.193 While the long history of 
treaty relations between European and African states on piracy and the slave trade 
provide early indications of that willingness, as well as the ‘recognition’ of ‘a jus 
commune gentium in certain matters, applicable equally to African as to European 
States’, Twiss did not yet regard the latter states as fully part of the ‘European State-
System’.194  
 But like Lorimer, Twiss saw this eventual recognition as lying with 
‘progress’—albeit not a speculative or metaphysical idea, but rather a particular focus 
on the maintenance of and adherence to treaty relations combined with the 
development of domestic legal institutions in a European mode. Twiss had no 
reservations in extending the term ‘state’ to any polity willing to operate under 
European international legal rules. But the exact position of these states within the 
European system remained precarious and contingent on abiding by those treaties. 
Ensuring stability in the successful intermixing of Western and Eastern civilisations 
was an inevitable, important question of progress to be answered, thought Twiss, by 
institutional development: ‘The problem ... in which all the Christian Nations of 
Europe have an equal interest is how to graft the political institutions of Western 
Europe upon the social institutions of the Mahommedan world’.195 Admitting that 
Eastern civilisations might ‘overtake’ Western ones, Twiss argued that Western races 
should maintain their permanent ‘prestige among the Eastern Races’ by ensuring the 
‘incorrupt administration of justice’.196 The context of this exhortation was the 
establishment of new international tribunals in Egypt which might also serve as 
models for the progress of local courts.197 
 Twiss’s writings on African colonial expansion introduced a second way in 
which he thought progress might occur while simultaneously avoiding the recognition 
of any ‘new’ states: by reviving older medieval forms of recognition, applying them to 
national-commercial entities, and urging the exercise of consular jurisdiction. His 
1883 pamphlet, ‘An International Protectorate of the Congo River’, which pre-dates 
the Berlin Conference and advocates for European penetration into the Congo by the 
establishment of a Protectorate rather than a neutral zone, ties recognition to older 
ideas of personal sovereignty in the context of commercial exchange precisely to avoid 
the recognition of indigenous polities.198 As with Egypt, Twiss saw the need for 
introducing European laws, but with modifications suited to the conditions of the 
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region. ‘Europe may feel called upon to engraft the same principles of public law upon 
the institutions of a sister continent, as may have been found to work well in Europe’, 
but the ideas of sovereignty prevailing among the tribal communities will require 
‘caution’—and also preclude their recognition as states: 
 
The organisation of the native races on the banks of the Congo is still tribal, and territorial. Sovereignty 
in the sense in which it has superseded personal Sovereignty in Europe, is still unknown. Personal 
Sovereignty, however, is recognised by the European traders on the Congo, and each factory hoists the 
flag of the nation, from which the trader holds himself to be entitled to claim protection, if he should be 
engaged by a native chief, or by a trader of another European nationality.199 
 
 For Twiss, these ‘local’ recognitions of personal sovereignty indicated the 
existence of an ‘element of order’ to which European governments ought to give their 
‘careful consideration’ before the ‘throng’ of traders arrives.200 Twiss’s solution lay in 
an International Commission of the Congo River built on recognition of personal 
sovereignty—albeit in the form of European consuls, not the recognition of indigenous 
sovereigns. ‘Personal Sovereignty, if effectively brought into play, would be an 
obvious remedy for the state of “wrong and unlaw”’: namely, each European state 
would authorise its own Commissioner to exercise consular jurisdiction on the state’s 
behalf over their citizens.201 The need for a judge consul—‘an institution of an age, 
when the theory of territorial Sovereignty had not as yet superseded in Europe that of 
personal Sovereignty’—arose from the posited impossibility of recognising  territorial 
sovereigns in the Congo region.202 Citing precedents of nineteenth-century 
international conferences granting Greek independence and resolving ‘political 
difficulties in Asia and Northern Africa’, and noting that no pre-existing suzerain 
entity is needed to give validity to this kind of agreement between Christian powers, 
Twiss concludes this new Congo Protectorate ‘would be an International accord 
worthy indeed of the civilisation of our epoch, and might arrest at once the further 
growth of any nascent difficulty’, that is, of European disagreements or warfare in the 
Congo.203 A creatively modified concept of recognition, reverting to old forms of 
sovereignty, is central to Twiss’s proposed solution. 
 While Twiss’s revised and enlarged 1884 treatise does not modify his account 
of the concept of recognition from its 1861 form, it does include an intriguing new 
preface that catalogues the major contemporary issues facing a changing system of 
international law, almost all of which bear on challenges to and expansions in the use 
of recognition.204 A first innovation is the centrality of international congresses for 
recognition practice. While changes within Western Europe, such as the constitution of 
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 the new German Empire and the unification of Italy, did not require recognition 
through conferences, the partial dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and the new 
independence of its Balkan kingdoms needed ‘the sanction of a Congress’.205 
Secondly, Twiss reads the ‘increased willingness ... to adjust … civil institutions to the 
general European standard’ in the Ottoman Empire and Egypt as an institutional 
development indicating that these polities had moved closer to inclusion in the system 
of European public law.206 Thirdly, and most substantially, Twiss provides a lengthy 
consideration of the recognition of ‘association’ territories in Africa, reflecting his 
recent interest in the Congo: 
 
Another question in connection with Africa has already assumed a prominent place inter apices juris 
Gentium [among the subtleties of the law of nations] ... namely the capacity of private associations of a 
philanthropic character to accept cessions of territory with full rights of dominion from the native chiefs 
of Africa, so as to acquire for any settlements which they may establish in such ceded territory a Status, 
which in due course of time will warrant on the part of the nations of Christendom a recognition of such 
settlements as independent States.207 
 
 Noting the abundance of cases in the ‘far East, where chartered companies 
have been the pioneers of European civilisation’ and have validly acquired 
‘international status … [by obtaining] cessions of territory and full rights of dominion 
from native chiefs’,208 Twiss discusses the establishment and gradual recognition of 
the independence of Liberia before noting the Congo Question: the problem raised by 
the Brussels Association’s lack of political control over settlements in the Upper 
Congo beyond ‘taking measures to secure that the frontiers of its settlements shall be 
open freely to the commerce of all the world’ and ensuring that any person can settle 
at its stations with equal rights and privileges on the condition of obeying its laws.209 
Declining to delve into this Question, Twiss states that several jurists have been 
‘embarrassed’ by their confused and ‘popular use of the term “Sovereignty”’ and 
suggests ‘“full dominion” would have been more appropriate’ in avoiding problems of 
Roman and Feudal law distinctions between personal and territorial sovereignty.210 To 
conclude the preface, Twiss reiterates his emphasis on independence as the signal of 
the capacity to be recognised, but now relates that requirement to the context of 
deepening colonial expansion and emphasising autonomy as the marker of 
independence: 
 
The Republic of France, which is acquiring the rights of Empire in the present day over extensive 
territories in Western Africa, acknowledges no personal Sovereign. It is the autonomy of a State which 
is the criterion of its independence, not the circumstance of its being ruled by a Sovereign Prince; and it 
is a lingering tradition of a past age, which suggests that none but Sovereign Princes or associations 
chartered by them can found settlements out of Europe, which will be entitled to claim international 
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recognition, when they are sufficiently matured to maintain the character and to discharge the duties of 
independent states.211 
 
 Liberia and Maryland are examples of this, with the former’s recognition 
achieved not by any European Congress ‘but after the example of the United States of 
America itself by a Catena [chain], so to say, of separate treaties with the leading 
states of the civilised world’.212 Twiss may well have thought his 1861 articulation 
needed no update even despite these new developments. Indeed, he seems to read them 
as bolstering his original views that independence and the willingness to observe the 
rules of the law of nations remain the major precursors to recognition.213 
 While Twiss’s writings in the early 1880s provide some indications of his 
creative use of the concept of recognition and his acknowledgement of a swathe of 
recognition questions raised by colonial expansions, it is his close practical 
involvement at the Berlin Conference in 1884–85 that provided the spur for later 
conceptual innovations; albeit innovations made in the writings of others.214 While 
part of the British delegation at the Berlin Conference, Twiss came to be an unofficial 
legal adviser to the King of Belgium, Leopold II, and reportedly drafted the 
constitution of the Congo Free State.215 Although Twiss was instrumental in the 
practical work of establishing the Congo Free State, he published only one article on 
the Berlin Conference, placing it on a similar standing as the Congress of Vienna in its 
influence on European public law and giving high praise to the work of the Belgians as 
‘preparing’ African populations for the principles of European international law.216 
Twiss’s involvement in the Congo Free State reflects the operationalisation of 
recognition theories of the time, extending its meaning to include privately-established 
states and solidifying its centrality for the colonial project. But it is with John 
Westlake’s texts that the concept of recognition is developed further to incorporate 
these new practical uses. 
 
B. Recognition in Westlake: sanitising Lorimer’s worldview 
 
Westlake’s writings reflect the clearest incorporation of post-Berlin Conference 
colonial projects into the concept of recognition.217 Westlake could fairly be called the 
most influential British jurist of the nineteenth and early twentieth century. He taught 
for more than two decades at Cambridge, published several major works, fostered 
Oppenheim’s career, and was lauded at the time of his death and for decades to come 
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 as a highly influential scholar.218 He was also a contemporary and close friend of 
Lorimer. They were both founding members of the Institut de Droit International, and 
kept up a lengthy correspondence. Westlake is thanked for his comments on the 
manuscript of Lorimer’s 1883 treatise, and received an honorary LLD from Lorimer’s 
University of Edinburgh. While they held very different approaches to international 
law—Westlake took up a historical-positivist approach along the lines of Henry 
Maine219 in contrast to Lorimer’s speculative naturalism—they were both familiar 
with continental thought.220  
 Westlake’s inaugural lecture in 1888 outlined a practical vision of 
international law which nonetheless incorporated many elements reminiscent of 
Lorimer’s thought. Like Lorimer, Westlake divides the subjects of international law 
into sovereign states, semi-sovereign states, and ‘half-civilized or uncivilized races’. 
The latter  ‘uncivilized or half-civilized races’ lie outside the system of states, and 
must be counted in the ‘several degrees in which they approach to having regular 
governments, … there would then be completed what might be called a Domesday 
Book of the world’.221 Westlake also tempered his focus on positive law with a more 
continental idea of ‘jural right’. Drawing an analogy with Bentham’s view that 
‘principles of legislation’ may guide the reform of national laws, Westlake saw ideas 
of jural right as debated by jurists as markers of how governments ought to cooperate 
in the duty of ‘bringing the positive rules of international law into accordance with the 
standard set by the best jural ideal of the time’.222 In a passage similar to Lorimer’s 
emphasis on community expression of rational will, Westlake sees these jural rights as 
contested rational positions emerging from the mass of social interactions among 
citizens—or for that matter, states—who live together and are tied by bonds that both 
serve their interests and mould their sentiments.223 Those bonds are not constructed or 
reformed by any ‘preconceived idea’ of perfect arrangements of rights, but rather 
endure and change through further interactions.224 Westlake sees no ‘obvious reason’ 
why these jural principles should be weaker in international society, but recognises the 
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strength of the development in the latter as stemming from the ‘habit of common 
action for common ends’; that is, international cooperation.225  
 Whereas Lorimer’s image of international society is of conflict between 
stratified ethno-national groups, the progress of which is a matter for their own 
internal political development as judged by European jurists, Westlake grounds his 
image of international society as necessitating a colonial, missionary project for the 
international lawyer to bring inferior civilisations up to the standards of Europe. In his 
1888 lecture Westlake said  
 
I deprecate the ignoring of personal responsibility quite as much with a view to the effect which the 
conduct of a great state may have on the destinies of other populations, especially of those which, as 
possessing less power or a lower civilization, are exposed to be most seriously affected by our action or 
our abstinence from action, while least able to help themselves.226 
 
 The ‘sound[ness]’ of international law, politics, and the treatment of inferior 
races demanded a sense of duty that could not be ‘roused’ by only studying 
‘abstractions’.227 Westlake’s view here has a longer provenance resting on 
Christianity and colonialism. In an 1868 essay, Westlake defended the Church of 
England as an important and useful tool of colonialism; a ‘powerful instrument for 
England in executing her task of spreading the best civilization over the world’.228 He 
envisaged that role as one of cultural transformation of colonised peoples, necessitated 
by Britain’s mission to found ‘new Christian states’ and act as ‘mediators between 
Christianity and Heathenism, from savage Africa to the most philosophical sects of 
India and China’ so as to bring their best ideas to Europe.229 
 This kind of thinking—progress, the mediation of ideas, personal duty—
underlies Westlake’s conception of international law in general. International law for 
Westlake comprised all general statements about ‘human action not internal to a 
political body’: descriptive knowledge about states, evaluations of their ‘strength’, 
appraisals of their degrees of subordination to each other.230 This better grounded 
Westlake’s image of the international lawyer as missionary and the discipline’s claims 
to the mantle of science:  
 
I have not chosen to define International Law as the science of the rules prevailing between states, and 
to treat as subsidiary the question of how far those rules are applicable to semi-sovereign states or to 
half civilized or uncivilized populations. I have chosen to put in the front the idea of action, which 
carries with it the ideas of duty and responsibility, and to define International Law as dealing with all 
human action not internal to a political body. From this point of view the subject is seen to have a real 
unity, though the rules of action will naturally differ in the circumstances.231 
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 Westlake’s later works sought to articulate these rules and their unity by gleaning 
specific principles from a close examination of the uses of international law within 
international society in recent decades.  
 Westlake’s concept of recognition rests on a range of other legal ideas: 
consular jurisdiction for the evaluation of non-European states, and territory, 
sovereignty and government for the dispossession of and refusal to recognise 
indigenous polities. These views are first articulated in his 1894 Chapters on the 
Principles of International Law, and later revised and presented in a more systematic 
form in his 1904 textbook. Like Twiss, Westlake examined the concepts of 
government, treaty-making capacity, jurisdiction and sovereign personality in the 
context of African and Asian political communities, but unlike Twiss, he incorporated 
those ideas much more clearly into his concept of recognition, and in a more technical, 
legalistic and positivist language. Westlake’s concept of recognition presented a more 
sanitised version of a worldview closely resembling Lorimer’s, and one that was also 
more appealing to practically-minded international lawyers. 
 Westlake’s foundational principles of international law were elements of a 
definition of the nature of international society. First, international society is the 
society of states with European civilisation: ‘States are its immediate, men its ultimate 
members.’232 Westlake confines current international society to first, all European 
states, secondly, American states that on gaining independence inherited European 
international law, and thirdly ‘a few Christian states in ‘other parts of the world’: 
Hawaii, Liberia and the Orange Free State, but not Abyssinia.233 In seeking to 
maintain ‘the rules of good breeding’, international society could, like a cricket club or 
trade union, maintain its rules by shunning those who do not observe them.234 
International society to Westlake was ‘not a voluntary but a necessary society’: states 
could not adhere to its rules only in part, and any state that is ‘geographically 
proximate’ to the society but not bound by its rules would be a source of ‘intolerable 
inconvenience and danger’.235 Consequently, new states emerging from older 
members must take up its rules entirely, but in dealing with nearby outsiders seeking 
admission, current members could admit them to ‘parts of its international law without 
necessarily admitting them to the whole of it’.236  
 Westlake treated this gradual admission to international society as a question 
of consular jurisdiction. Whereas Twiss saw consular jurisdiction as a proposal for 
furthering civilisation in ‘uninhabited’ regions, Westlake saw it as a mark of partial 
inclusion. ‘[S]ubstituted for rules of jurisdiction belonging to ordinary international 
law’ in Japan, China and Turkey, consular jurisdiction presented ‘an instance of the 
way in which all human institutions, being free and not mechanical products, shade off 
from one to another’.237 While Europeans and Americans abroad cannot be assured of 
adequate protection against non-European governments, who each hold ‘unfamiliar 
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interests arising out of [their] foreign civilization’,238 the presence of effective consuls 
within Turkey, Persia, China, Japan and Siam mean those states must be recognised as 
possessing stable legal orders ‘different’—rather than explicitly inferior—to those of 
Europe.239 The maintenance of that jurisdiction, and this status, relies nonetheless on 
‘local support’ which requires (and evidences) that a non-European state possesses 
 
an old and stable order of its own, with organized force at the back of it, and complex enough for the 
leading minds of the country to be able to appreciate the necessities of an order different from theirs. 
Such countries must therefore be recognised as being civilised, though with other civilisation than 
ours.240 
 
To Westlake, commonality of civilisation prerequisite to full membership of 
international society was possible through development—‘civilisation has grown up 
by degrees, and populations have become included in it among whom it did not 
originate’.241 The touchstone of this civilisation, however, remains the confidence that 
European powers maintain that the legal rights of their citizens will be treated on an 
equal basis with that of native citizens, without any unfair discrimination, in courts 
backed by a government holding effective control over a territory. Non-European 
states may be partly recognised through treaty relations, but the attainment of full 
status depends on a system of consular jurisdiction acceptable to Europe. 
 In the ‘uncivilised regions’, Westlake contended that an absence of statehood 
precluded the possibility of recognition of indigenous tribes—except as part of the 
processes of assimilating them into a colonial power. In making this argument, 
Westlake relies on the ideas of territorial sovereignty, property, treaty-making 
capacities, and government. Again, these ideas are similar to those used by Twiss, but 
Westlake constructs a more coherent doctrinal position with a stronger, clearer 
position for recognition. While territorial sovereignty resembles property in land it 
differs in exclusiveness and alienability: one state can exclude another from acts in its 
territory, and, subject to the rules of international society, one state can alienate its 
sovereignty.242 With the breakdown of feudalism the ‘confusion’ between property 
and government became clear.243 For Westlake the origins of title to territory as 
sovereignty in the old civilised world and old states of ‘different’ civilisation cannot be 
discussed now except as a series of cessions or conquests; he turns instead to ‘new 
countries’ to outline its expansion beyond Europe.244 Where a civilised state founds a 
colony, the title to its land ‘may sometimes be deduced by the proprietors from a 
situation of fact which existed before the civilised government was established, and 
which that government has accepted and clothed with its sanction’: that is, either the 
presence of ‘advanced’ natives holding ideas of property or the settlement of European 
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 pioneers.245 But generally, title to land in a colony ‘is traced from a grant by the state’, 
in turn authorised by that state’s own territorial sovereignty, and involves the state 
assuming property in all the land that it was ‘not morally compelled to acknowledge as 
belonging to natives or to the pioneers’.246 In either case, concludes Westlake, 
property originates in sovereignty.  
 For Westlake this is a question of recognition; not of a new state, but of the 
extension of territorial sovereignty as a positivist question of fact: ‘what facts are 
necessary and sufficient in order that an uncivilized region may be internationally 
recognised as appropriated in sovereignty to a particular state?’.247 But answering this 
question lies with international society: the rights of native tribes are to be ‘left to the 
conscience of the state’ that has been recognised as appropriating their territory.248 
Westlake states that while this proposition is ‘at first startling’ it ‘becomes almost 
axiomatic’ because international society is too weakly organised to enforce rules ‘for 
the benefit of outsiders’, and must leave that action to individual members alone.249 
This new role for recognition reflects the outcome of the Berlin Conference, to which 
Westlake now turns to analyse carefully. Berlin established the system whereby a 
European state that had made ‘an accession of territory on the coast of Africa’ would 
notify the other powers, which would then have an opportunity to object.250 In 
Westlake’s view this outcome bolstered the conference’s central aim of facilitating and 
expediting colonial expansion—as he put it, ‘avoid[ing] collisions between 
[conference] members’—by clarifying their coastal claims, and preventing any 
European objections that ‘native title ... had not been duly ceded’.251 Westlake 
envisages a range of questions which might be raised by other powers in making those 
objections: 
 
Is any territorial cession permitted by the ideas of the tribe? What is the authority—chief, elders, body 
of fighting men—if there is one, which those ideas point out as empowered to make the cession? With 
what formalities do they require it to be made, if they allow it to be made at all? These questions are too 
obscure among uncivilised populations, or, if they are clear to them, too obscure for the whites who are 
in contact with them ...252 
 
Westlake endorses this approach as necessary for avoiding unnecessary conflicts, 
without causing injustice to the natives, who now gain ‘more than the common claim 
of the governed[:] they have the claim of the ignorant and helpless on the enlightened 
and strong; and that claim is the more likely to receive justice, the freer is the position 
of the governors from insecurity and vexation’.253  
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 Both the denial of the sovereignty of native tribes and their incorporation as 
protected by the coloniser rested on a purported lack of government, which Westlake 
announces as the ‘international test of civilisation’.254 Where native tribes govern 
themselves by, say, the standards of ‘Asiatic empires’, Westlake concedes that the 
rules of European international society require that they be ‘take[n] account of’ and 
have their title to territory acknowledged.255 But where this cannot be shown, ‘the first 
necessity is that a government should be furnished’.256 While that duty falls to the 
colonising power, Westlake also uses the absence of government to erase earlier 
agreements: treaties between European officials or private subjects with native tribes 
that purport to cede sovereignty cannot be taken to do so and will not be recognised as 
conferring international title because tribes lack the ability to consent.257 This position 
is aimed explicitly against the claims of Portuguese jurists that treaties concluded 
between Portugal and various tribes had the effect of ceding sovereignty to 
Portugal.258  
 Instead, acquisition of territory through taking up the responsibilities of 
government proceeds by recognising an indigenous polity—not as an international 
subject, but rather as a domestic, dependent nation immediately incorporated into the 
colonising empire. Westlake praises a detailed treaty made with the Makololo, ‘chiefs 
of a nation which for intelligence and character ranks very high among those which 
must be still called uncivilized’, in which those chiefs explicitly promised peaceful 
relations, allowed British subjects freedom of movement and trade in accordance with 
local laws, agreed that disputes would be settled by a representative of the British 
Crown, and guaranteed that they would not cede territory to any other power without 
British consent.259 Westlake interprets this as evidence that the Makololo understand 
their lack of ability to cede territorial sovereignty or to consent to ‘the right which the 
queen [sic] may one day come to exercise’ to found a government there.260 This 
interaction constitutes the recognition of the Makololo in an imperial, internal sense, 
as a domestic, dependent nation: 
 
[I]n the mean time [that is, prior to establishing a regular government] the Makololo are recognised as a 
nation under their chiefs, capable of entering into relations with the queen’s government [sic] in matters 
within their comprehension ... Every foundation is therefore laid, to the extent admitted by the nature of 
the case, for the future development of territorial sovereignty in the civilised and international sense, 
and for the permanence under it of such rights as the Makololo already possessed. ... the Makololo are 
admitted as a ‘domestic dependent nation’ ...261 
 
 Having concluded that uncivilised tribes can at best gain recognition as 
domestic dependent nations, Westlake turns to show that inchoate titles to territorial 
sovereignty within uncivilised regions must be perfected by occupation. Occupation 
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 carries the duty of establishing an authority to ‘which may protect the natives with 
whom contact has become inevitable’ and capable of protecting ‘the civil rights 
essential to European or American life’.262 Perfecting international title requires first a 
clear declaration of the particulars of the title by a state, and secondly the actual 
fulfilment of those duties of occupation at some point.263 But Westlake offers a stern 
response to the claim, again advanced by Portuguese jurists, that a civilising influence 
may perfect international title: ‘the value and efficacy of such efforts are sure to be 
differently appreciated by the power which builds on them and by the power against 
which the title is invoked’.264 Progress in the civilising mission strengthens the 
coloniser’s claim to title, which other Europeans ought not question. If native tribes 
had moved towards European civilisation even ‘without the training and discipline 
which results from European government or control’, the state that had failed to 
establish its authority there was itself solely to blame for losing that ‘prospective 
benefit’.265 It seems, then, that manifest failures in that mission might allow an 
indigenous nation recognition on its own terms. 
 Finally, Westlake turns to protectorates and their relation to independence and 
recognition. A protectorate in the civilised world is a state with semi-sovereign 
international status, in that its foreign affairs are ‘managed for it’ by the protector state 
that also grants it some degree of internal freedom. Yet because uncivilised regions 
lack states Westlake holds that there can be no protectorates there.266 To Westlake, a 
protectorate claim effectively carries the same obligation of establishing governmental 
authority as a new possession. The recent usage of this term has arisen, Westlake 
suspects, for the practical reason that if a state ‘wearies of its task’ abandoning a 
protectorate carries a lesser loss of prestige, but also gives ‘greater freedom’ in the 
steps towards acquisition.267  
 In his 1904 textbook, Westlake not only repeated the points above but further 
bolstered and systematised them by presenting his concept of recognition in the form 
of a taxonomy. Westlake classifies states based on governmental independence and 
foreign relations: fully independent states exercise governmental control over their 
territory and ‘to some extent’ their subjects, and their external sovereignty is not 
dependent on the type of government, only its capacity to be part of international 
society through foreign relations; semi-sovereign or dependent states are more or less 
free in internal government but constrained by their protectors in foreign relations.268 
Westlake then outlines his taxonomy of seven processes by which new members have 
joined ‘full international society’. First, recognition by political action (Russia, after 
Peter I).269 Secondly, by ‘being freed’ from consular jurisdiction (Japan as of 
1904).270 Thirdly, by the creation of a state with a European mode of government in 
                                                 
262 Westlake, Chapters, 159. 
263 See ibid, 160–66. 
264 Ibid, 175, and see at 174–77. 
265 Ibid, 177. 
266 Ibid, 177–78, and see at 178–79 (on the misuse of the term ‘protectorate’). 
267 Ibid, 183–84. 
268 See J Westlake, International Law: Part I: Peace (CUP 1904) 20–27, 40–41. 
269 Ibid, 45. 
270 Ibid, 45–46. 
an uncivilised region, the most important example being the Congo State, which was 
admitted due to its international private association attaining ‘so solid a footing’ that it 
concluded treaties with the United States and European powers and was admitted to 
sign the General Act of the Berlin Conference, as well as Liberia: ‘Here we see 
European institutions, learnt on civilised soil by men of other blood and transported by 
them to another region of the earth, accepted as equivalent of European blood’.271 
Fourthly, by voluntary subdivision within an old member to create a new state, as in 
the separation of the thrones of Portugal and Brazil.272 Fifthly, through arrangements 
between the Great Powers in resolving independence struggles through agreement 
between European powers, as in Belgium, ‘Rumania’ and ‘Servia’, and 
Montenegro.273 Sixthly, belligerent secession recognised by the state from which the 
new state has separated, as in the case of the United States, the Spanish South 
American republics, and Greece.274 Finally, Turkey’s partial admission to the public 
law and system of Europe, which, while still involving consular jurisdiction by 
European states, guaranteed the protection of Turkey’s territorial integrity and her 
apparent inclusion in decisions on questions of changes to territories within Europe, a 
central tenet of the Westphalian system.275  
 Westlake’s concept of recognition reflects a more varied international society 
and is less explicitly racialised than Lorimer’s. Yet it clearly replicates and advances 
the latter’s division of the world into civilised, semi-civilised and barbarous, and is 
given new purpose in justifying and legalising colonial activities after the Berlin 
Conference. Westlake entrenches Lorimer’s progressive movements through stages of 
recognition by providing more detailed explanations of that process, newly based in 
questions of law and fact: the gradual removal of consular jurisdiction or through 
colonial appropriation of uncivilised lands, which in turn rely on ideas of jurisdiction, 
territorial sovereignty, treaty-making capacity and governmental systems which are 
now incorporated into the new uses and meanings of recognition.  
 
C. Oppenheim’s neutralisation of recognition 
 
Oppenheim’s International Law, appearing in 1905, completes Westlake’s turn to 
technical, positivistic international lawyering and the sanitisation of the concept of 
recognition. Educated in Germany and Switzerland, Oppenheim moved to Britain in 
1895 and became a citizen in 1900. He taught at the London School of Economics 
before succeeding Westlake in the Whewell Chair in 1908. Oppenheim saw the role 
for legal philosophy as ‘lay[ing] bare the religious, ethical, economic, sociological, 
and ethnological roots of legal institutions’.276 Theory must try to understand and 
define the influence of political ideas on legal institutions, but also always refrain from 
‘fight[ing] for and against certain political ideas’ because these lie within ‘the unsafe 
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 vessel of party politics’ far from the ‘safe ground’ of jurisprudence.277 As Kingsbury 
has argued, this apparently strict separation of law from politics, far from being 
‘neutral’ about political projects, was the conception of law that best furthered 
Oppenheim’s own moral and political values.278 Oppenheim’s concept of recognition 
concords with that view: ostensibly it omits substantive criteria like internal 
government control in favour of the simple consent of current members of the family 
of nations. While civilisation is retained as a requirement of membership, 
Oppenheim’s discussion of its meaning seems to empty it of any substantive political 
content. Yet far from removing chauvinist European superiority, Oppenheim’s project 
of extending international law’s reach subsumes that hierarchy by entrenching states as 
the only persons recognisable in international law. In removing and neutralising 
significant parts of the conceptual content built up by jurists like Lorimer, Twiss and 
Westlake, Oppenheim grants recognition a more prominent teleological, ideological 
and political role within international law itself. The great influence of Oppenheim’s 
work279 and concept of recognition make his innovations here especially important. 
 In defining international society and its law, Oppenheim simultaneously 
makes civilisation central and strips it of clear substantive criteria. For Oppenheim, 
international law is the body of customary and conventional rules binding on civilised 
states in their intercourse with each other.280 All law is based in common consent of 
those it binds, and international law’s basis is in the common consent of members of 
the ‘Family of Nations’.281 International law neither extends as far as humanity itself 
nor only to Christian civilisation but instead is limited to members of the Family of 
Nations.282 To be admitted to the Family of Nations a state ‘must, first, be a civilised 
State which is in constant intercourse with members of the Family of Nations’. 
Second, the state must ‘expressly or tacitly consent to be bound for its future 
international conduct by the rules of International Law’. Third, ‘those States which 
have hitherto formed the Family of Nations must expressly or tacitly consent to the 
reception of the new member’.283  
 Oppenheim sees the last two requirements as ‘so obvious that they need no 
comment’, but concedes that civilisation is somewhat more difficult. Civilisation is not 
confined to Christian civilisation, but must be ‘conditioned as to enable the respective 
State and its subjects to understand and act in conformity with the principles of the 
Law of Nations’.284 Compared with the elaborate disquisitions of earlier jurists and 
their explicit use of European or Christian to give ‘civilisation’ conceptual content, 
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Oppenheim’s definition of ‘civilisation’ is vague and seemingly stripped of 
Eurocentric ideological, religious or political content. Further, any conceptual content 
to civilisation seems effectively subsumed by the second general criteria of willingness 
to abide by current international law. The vagueness here might be due to 
Oppenheim’s stated intention to phrase ambiguous terms ‘intentionally ... because the 
actualities on which they are based are not altogether clear’,285 and civilisation is 
clearly ambiguous (even to Twiss and Westlake). Another possibility is that by 1905, 
civilisation is both too contested and no longer a particularly useful criterion for 
understanding the concept of recognition because ‘pressing circumstances’ have 
obliged ‘Christian States ... to receive several non-Christian states into the community 
of States’.286 Either way, Oppenheim both makes civilisation central and refrains from 
stating any clear religious, political or ideological criteria of civilisation. 
 But in accounting for the development of international law, Oppenheim 
clarifies what kinds of polities he considers ‘civilised’. Oppenheim sees the present 
coverage of international law as a ‘product of historical development, within which 
epochs are distinguishable marked by successive entrances of various States into the 
Family of Nations’. The first three are uncontroversial: first, the old Christian states of 
Europe; secondly the Christian states outside of Europe in the Americas, Liberia and 
Haiti; thirdly, Turkey’s 1856 entry, with which international law ‘ceased to be a law 
between Christian States solely’.287 The fourth epoch involved the entry of Japan, 
which, since the war with China in 1895, can no longer be doubted as a ‘real and full 
member’ and is now a Great Power.288 The fifth epoch is the partial inclusion of states 
like Persia, Siam, China, Korea, Abyssinia, whose position remains ‘doubtful’ on the 
basis of their civilisation. While they are ‘certainly civilised’, that civilisation has not 
yet attained a level at which their governments and populations are able to understand 
and carry out all the commands of international law.289 Although treaty, trade and 
diplomatic interactions between them and Europe are clear, and despite Oppenheim’s 
prediction they will ‘certainly succeed’ in attaining that level of civilisation through 
education their populaces and enacting modern reforms, without having completed 
that transition they cannot be received ‘as full members into the Family of Nations’ 
and must remain ‘for some parts within the circle’ and for others outside.290 The 
Congo Free State forms the sixth epoch, joining the Family of Nations after the Berlin 
Conference.291  
 Oppenheim is comfortable with degrees and divisions in the ideas of 
sovereignty, independence and statehood where these are necessitated by the facts of 
international life, and is content to refrain from general rules if special cases are the 
norm.292 He uses the language of international personality to capture the diversity of 
international life. Sovereign states—a people living in community within a territory, 
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 with both a government that represents the people and rules according to the law of the 
land as well as a sovereign government, independent of any other ‘earthly 
authority’293—are international persons. But ‘imperfect’ or ‘not-full’ states, as well as 
‘apparent, but not real’ international persons can also exist—states within federations, 
recognised insurgents and the Holy See, for example—but these are only partly treated 
as international persons, ‘without becoming thereby members of the Family of 
Nations’.294 Suzerains, protectorates and states within federations may hold supreme 
authority in some tasks, but in others rely on the authority of another state, and in this 
sense are always anomalous but tending, as ‘history shows’, to gain full sovereignty or 
disappear into province status.295 
 Unlike the jurists examined above, Oppenheim’s concept of recognition is less 
concerned with identifying the ‘marks’ or factual characteristics of a polity that would 
make it capable of recognition. Instead, he emphasises the process of 
acknowledgement by the Family of Nations; it is for current members to decide the 
criteria of statehood, the processes of recognition, and to assess whether they have 
been met in a would-be newcomer. A political community may well exist as a state, 
but absent recognition by other states it remains outside of international law, expressed 
in Oppenheim’s oft-cited statement of what would become the central plank of the 
constitutive theory of recognition: ‘A State is and becomes an International Person 
through recognition only and exclusively.’296 Oppenheim acknowledges that ‘[m]any 
writers do not agree with this opinion’—arguing for example that secessions from 
existing recognised states includes immediate international personality and entry as of 
right into the Family of Nations, as in the case of Belgium in 1831—but he insists that 
the ‘real facts of international life’ run against this view.297 Prior to recognition states 
hold no international rights and cannot claim a right to be recognised, and while states 
may still exist without recognition, absent recognition the Family of Nations ‘takes no 
notice’ of it.298 Recognition can occur through formal declarations, the reception of 
diplomats, appointment of consuls or conclusion of treaties.299 While it is usually 
practically impossible to deny recognition, Oppenheim states that the decision ‘is not a 
matter of International Law but of international policy’.300 Although conditions may 
be imposed on newcomers,301 recognition of a new form of government does not 
involve any question of legitimacy, and merely signifies that current members are 
ready to deal with the new government.302 
 With recognition comes international personhood, though for Oppenheim the 
facts of international life mean that the meaning and characteristics of that personhood 
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are not stable. First, he strongly rejects ideas of ‘fundamental rights’ attaching to 
states, described and debated under headings like existence, self-preservation, equality, 
independence, territorial supremacy, intercourse and reputation.303 These ideas collect 
‘numerous real rights and duties’ but they arise from customary recognition among 
members of the Family of Nations, not from inherent aspects of states.304 Secondly, he 
allows for a great deal of flexibility in different kinds of international persons 
depending both on facts and acceptance by other members of the Family of Nations. 
Recognition of a change in government type does not change international 
personality,305 though changes to independence—becoming part of a federal state, 
coming under suzerainty or a protectorate—do. Vassals and protectorates may hold 
‘some small position’ of their own in the Family of Nations as a ‘portion’ of the 
suzerain or protector state, depending on their capacities for relations with other 
members, such as powers to send and receive envoys of their own (as in Bulgaria and 
Egypt) or conclude treaties with the approval of the protector (as in South Africa).306 
Thirdly, while there is no essential difference between Christian and non-Christian 
States, civilisational differences are differences of ‘kind’ and ‘position’ but do not 
warrant exclusion from the Family of Nations. Where individual states send and 
receive envoys or conclude treaties they indicate that in those respects they recognise 
and receive a non-Christian state into the Family of Nations.307 In particular, non-
Christian states are outside the Family of Nations for the purposes of war, and may be 
treated according to discretion only.308 But Oppenheim predicts that ‘with the 
progress of civilisation’ non-Christian states will ‘become sooner or later International 
Persons in the full sense of the term’.309 
 With this passage the issue of Oppenheim’s vagueness as to the ways in which 
non-Christian states are inferior arises again, now specifically in relation to 
recognition. While, like Westlake, Oppenheim criticises the inferiority of their peoples 
and governments, this does not have any real effect on status or capacity: Turkey to 
Oppenheim seems to be a full member of the Family of Nations despite the persistence 
of consular jurisdiction. With ‘development’ — though the kind or extent is never 
clearly laid out — non-European states will eventually attain European-standards of 
civilisation. In the meantime, treaties signed in various subject areas will extend the 
reach of international obligations. Given the reference to discretion in warfare and 
Japan’s ascension on the basis of its war with China in 1895 (though it is not clear 
whether the victory itself or Japan’s ‘humane’ conduct of warfare is the significant 
factor) Oppenheim may simply doubt that the conduct of these states in warfare would 
match European rules, absent any practice of these states to suggest otherwise. A state 
may also be a member of the Family of Nations by virtue of being a protectorate of a 
full sovereign, as in the case of Abyssinia prior to 1896 and Madagascar.310 Lower 
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 civilisation still remains as a label, but it is essentially bereft of content or 
consequences in that the vague ‘parts’ for which non-European states are members of 
the Family of Nations bound by international law are those rules to which they have 
(ostensibly) consented. 
 By making civilisation central and yet neutralised in the concept of 
recognition, Oppenheim moves to fixate on the state and removes much of the 
substantive content given to ideas like civilisation, Europeanness and government that 
played such important roles in the works of Westlake, Twiss and Lorimer and their 
exclusion of various non-European political communities. While he does provide an 
exhaustive list of states present in the world of 1905,311 Oppenheim never provides an 
example of a state that does exist but nevertheless still falls entirely outside of the 
membership of the Family of Nations. Like Westlake, he sees small tribal political 
communities as clearly not falling within the definition of state, and therefore not 
capable of being recognised. But while Oppenheim follows Westlake’s thinking on the 
creation of new states in Africa, he argues that recognition—and not ideas of progress, 
territorial acquisition, or colonial improvement on which Westlake draws—plays a 
definitive role. Oppenheim simply argues that regardless of how territory was 
acquired, the formation of a new state is a matter of fact, but it is only through 
recognition that it ‘becomes a member of the Family of Nations and a subject of 
International Law’.312 What changes here from Westlake’s account is the absence of 
express emphasis on a colonial mission, of spreading civilisation or European-style 
government, for understanding when and where authority is exercised over new 
territory. These ideas are not disavowed in Oppenheim’s text, but they are subsumed 
by his focus on states and positive rules established by clear common consent.  
 The signal effect of this move is the shift away from the colonial context as 
explicitly relevant for the concept of recognition. In addressing colonial acquisitions, 
Oppenheim treats these as simple questions of territorial control and thus of no real 
concern to international law. As García-Salmones Rovira points out, Oppenheim, 
contrary to most international lawyers of the day, expressed little concern about an 
absence of formal administration over colonies and their peoples.313 Because the state 
is the sole focus of international law, these projects are, to Oppenheim, outside of the 
‘dominion of the Law of Nations’: ‘all such acquisition is made either by occupation 
of hitherto uninhabited land ... or by cession from a native tribe living on the land’.314 
A state can only occupy territory that is not part of any state (either uninhabited or 
inhabited only by native tribes), and even the territory of a state ‘entirely outside the 
Family of Nations’ must be conquered or ceded.315 Taking possession, establishing an 
administration over the territory ‘of and for the acquiring State’ is the only relevant 
test for occupation, and it is only when other members of the Family of Nations 
recognise this acquisition as part of the coloniser’s territory, or as a new separate state, 
that international law comes to be relevant.316 Agreements with native tribes ‘by 
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which they submit themselves to the sway of the occupying State’ are irrelevant and 
have at best moral value: because tribal chiefs are not heads of state but only heads of 
tribes, they cannot engage in state–state relations, and hence cannot properly cede 
territory or conclude treaties that have anything more than ‘moral value’.317 
Consequently, the legal consequences of particular modes of colonial territorial 
acquisition that were so important for Westlake and Twiss are either irrelevant or 
merely titles to be recognised or not by the community of nations. 
 What then does Oppenheim’s work suggest about the state of recognition just 
prior to the First World War? Oppenheim’s second edition, appearing just before the 
outbreak of that war, includes updates to reflect the crises in the Balkans and the 
breakdown of the 1878 Berlin Congress, and noting the presence of China, Persia and 
Siam at the Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907, as well as Great Power 
interventions in Morocco and Abyssinia in 1906 and 1907.318 Oppenheim adds in this 
edition that some of these states ‘are at present in a state of transition, and some of 
them are the subjects of international arrangements of great political importance’.319 
Oppenheim’s world is one in which the nation-state is no longer a solely Christian or 
European construct: Turkey and Japan have achieved full statehood, and in Japan’s 
case this position as an equal of Europe was only bolstered by its victory against 
Russia in the 1905 Russo–Japanese war. Statehood is relatively easily achieved in this 
world, and while even the most basic interactions with current members will constitute 
international personality and membership, small states are present at new large 
international conferences. Finally, Oppenheim represents some move away from the 
nineteenth century consensus that the Great Powers held central, determining status in 
questions of recognition, noting that their status and influence is a result of power and 
obedience, and not derived from law.320 Amidst a large increase in new small states, 
and the relatively equal engagement through law between all states, European and 
non-European alike, power is of—seemingly—lesser importance. 
 
VI. CONTESTATION IN THE INTERWAR PERIOD: WILLIAMS, BATY AND LAUTERPACHT, 
1915–50 
 
Oppenheim’s works shifted focus to the state, subsuming race, civilisation and 
government into that focus, and making recognition the marker of membership of the 
Family of Nations. Oppenheim’s relative lack of emphasis on civilisation as such, is an 
important element of the traditional (and now frequently challenged) narrative that 
positivist international law flourished in the interwar period partly because it focused 
on, and reified, an abstracted state that remained in reality reflective of the European 
nation-state.321 After the end of the First World War, amidst major upheavals in 
international organisation in the League of Nations system and the new technical and 
advisory prominence for international lawyers within it, imperialist, colonialist and 
                                                 
317 Ibid, 277–81. 
318 L Oppenheim, International Law: A Treatise (2nd edn, Longmans, Green and Co, 1912). 
319 Ibid, 156. 
320 Oppenheim, International Law (1905), 163ff, citing Lorimer and Westlake as maintaining the 
contrary view. 
321 See, eg, García-Salmones Rovira, Project of Positivism. 
 civilisational thinking persisted in different guises.322 The collapse of the German, 
Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian Empires, the shifts in colonial rule with the 
new mandate system, and the move from dominion to semi-independence within parts 
of the British Empire, created a raft of new political entities of varying levels of 
independence, statehood and protectorate status throughout the world of the 1920s. 
Statehood and its nature became urgent problems of the interwar period, but not only 
confined to relations between European and non-European entities. The League also 
sought to avoid the repetition of the horrors of the First World War, which had shaken 
widely held convictions about the superiority of European civilisation and confidence 
in liberal progressive ideas, through the project to outlaw war. Peace was to be 
attained through international organisation. The League’s principle of universality 
meant that it was to be open to ‘[a]ny fully self-governing state, Dominion or colony’ 
that accepted to be bound by international law and an admission vote by two-thirds of 
the current members,323 reflecting criteria seen in the works of Twiss, Westlake and 
Oppenheim. But, as one commentator at the time put it, this admission system 
‘inevitably brought [the League] into conflict with the theories of international law 
elaborated in pre-League days’ most importantly the concept of recognition and 
specifically whether admission superseded, was synonymous with, or was entirely 
separate from recognition.324  
 Against this backdrop of new states, new revolutions, new modes of colonial 
control, and the mainstream dominance of positivist methods in international legal 
argument, recognition once again became a central question for British interwar 
international lawyers. In their works, it attains its status as a basic concept in 
international law. In various ways, Sir John Fischer Williams, Thomas Baty and 
Hersch Lauterpacht—the major British thinkers on recognition in the interwar 
period—present ruptures with earlier British theories as well as those of their 
continental contemporaries. They criticise civilisational superiority as well as the 
centrality of the state which characterise positivist accounts of recognition. Their 
lengthy and close attention to debates about the meaning of recognition incorporate 
and react to a variety of projects of the day: for Williams, equalising international 
society and outlawing war, and for Baty and Lauterpacht—albeit in very different 
ways—the project of securing a genuine legal frame to political actions of states. Each 
of these jurists articulates a powerful vision of law in international society and 
diplomacy, and the interwar period sees political projects tied much more closely to 
their concepts of recognition. These works also provide some indications of slight 
‘democratisation’ of the concept of recognition as a central question for interlocutors 
on international politics. It is thus in the interwar period and in these writings that 
recognition can be seen as finally emergent as a basic concept in international law. 
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 A. Williams: recognition in service of equality and peace 
 
Sir John Fischer Williams was the first British jurist to write extensively on the 
concept of recognition in the interwar period. Williams saw the concept of recognition, 
when combined with a fairer, representative and universal League of Nations that 
entrenched diplomacy in accordance with international law, as the best hope for 
equalising international society and avoiding war. Williams was a liberal humanist 
international lawyer working within the institutions of the League of Nations 
throughout the interwar period, and is primarily remembered as a superb practitioner 
and adviser to the British Government, the British representative at the League and on 
the Versailles Reparation Commission (1920–30) and as the British Member of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration (1936–47).325 While Williams might be seen as a 
consummate ‘British’ international lawyer oriented to practice over theory,326 he still 
held a firm interest in concepts, foundations and the structure of international law and 
published in academic forums. In accordance with his intellectual lodestars of 
Westlake, Arnold McNair and James Brierly, Williams understood the importance of 
focusing on concrete problems, rules and diplomatic practice even when considering 
more abstract international legal problems. Brierly’s influence on Williams is 
substantial, and the latter’s work on recognition can be seen as a more in-depth, 
philosophical articulation of Brierly’s brief defence of the declaratory view.327 Yet, 
Williams frequently expresses unease with stricter forms of positivism and formalism 
associated with thinkers like Brierly and McNair. As reflected in his concept of 
recognition, Williams held that international law must contain general principles 
resting on broader ideals of progress, humanity, universalism and peace. In his view, 
the peculiarities and primitiveness of the interwar international legal system placed a 
higher burden of responsibilities on its practitioners than that which lay with the 
domestic practitioner, specifically to develop international law and to ensure its careful 
use: ‘This activity [of international law] and these advances [since the First World 
War] show the necessity both of caution and of audacity. The needs of the world 
demand a bold advance, and the critical nature of the issues involved make a false step 
more perilous than ever before’.328 
 Williams’ first publication on recognition is his address to the Grotius Society 
in 1929 on new states and governments, in which he outlines a concept of recognition 
aimed at equalising international society. The meaning of recognition, which is 
‘nearly, but perhaps not quite, self-explanatory’, is a straightforward declaratory one: 
recognition is the operation by which an existing state ‘admits’ that a new state exists 
and is part of international society, intimating readiness to or actually instituting 
relations with it, and in the case of a new government is the acceptance that it now 
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 represents the old state combined with the continuation or renewal of relations.329 
Rather than looking to recent judicial decisions and diplomatic pronouncements,330 
Williams first examines juristic works, before moving to deductive arguments, and 
concluding with specific problems of the world and the League. By this time, 
constitutive and declaratory theories are clearly entrenched opposing views. Rather 
than ‘weighing the authorities’ on the ‘sides’ represented by Oppenheim against 
Bluntschli’s rights approach, Williams considers it ‘better to see to what practical 
conclusions we are led by the adoption of either theory’331 by splitting the major 
issues of state recognition into ‘two separate, if closely allied, propositions’: ‘(1) Has 
‘recognition’ a creative efficacy? Do States become States as a result of recognition 
and not otherwise? (2) Have bodies of men organised as States a right to ‘recognition,’ 
or are existing states free as a matter of International Law to give or refuse 
“recognition”?’332 
What follows is a thoroughgoing critique and denial of ‘creative 
efficacy’—Williams’ term for the central point of the constitutive theory; that 
recognition ‘creates’ states, which he considers supported by ‘great authority’333—and 
more generally of positivist approaches to international law.  
 Central to this criticism is Williams’ own attempt to neutralise the criteria of 
‘civilisation’. Despite the similarities with Oppenheim’s less direct attempts to do the 
same, Williams is clearly less enamoured of the claimed civility of international 
society central to Oppenheim’s view. Williams contends that if the ‘civilised world’ 
consists of people divided into states and international law regulates ‘the relations of 
those States as subjects having rights and duties’, then older States cannot claim any 
prerogative power of ‘making what is already a State into an “international 
person”’.334 The positivist, thinks Williams, would dispute the definition of 
international law and insist on Oppenheim’s account of it.335 But positivism is ‘not 
inconsistent with the view that the question whether a State is civilised is a question of 
fact and that, once [that fact] is established to the satisfaction of the general sense of 
mankind, or otherwise apparent, that State becomes ipso facto a subject of 
International Law.’336 While humankind’s status as the entity to be ‘satisfied’ remains 
somewhat unclear—is it the arbiter or standard of civilisation?—significantly, 
humankind, not merely European nations, is the referent for civilisation.  
 Like Oppenheim, however, Williams seems to remove substantive criteria 
from the idea of civilisation. With his post-First World War wariness of nationalism 
and the centrality of states, Williams does not equate civilisation with statehood. 
Rather he tries to remove its substantive aspects by analogising pre-war forms of 
international society to a formerly ‘close corporation’ now opened up beyond the 
members of a single controlling family, to any person resembling a state: 
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... the conception of ‘the Concert of Europe’ as the body entrusted with the keys of civilised society has 
now only an historic interest ... when the close corporation with its governing body has disappeared, 
admission to the larger society which has taken its place cannot be regulated by the independent 
decisions of a number of separate and unrelated individual members of the society. Membership of the 
new society must be a right of all organised sovereign communities, whose civilisation permits them to 
understand and to recognise international duties—even if they fail occasionally, as we all fail, to 
discharge them.337 
 
 This passage reveals a significant conceptual shift. Williams purports to 
embrace the apparent removal of European control over admission to the society of 
nations, now too wide and diverse to remain the preserve of Europe. Notably, he 
acknowledges that a failure to follow international law in all instances should not place 
a community beyond recognition: what matters is the acknowledgement of 
international law’s demands, which the War and the League should remind us, may be 
ignored or flaunted by even the oldest ‘civilisations’. Rather than removing 
civilisation, Williams promotes a more ecumenical idea that (paradoxically for the 
times) should not be evaluated by Europe. ‘[H]uman society’ can no longer, contra 
Westlake, be seen as an ‘exclusive club’ that leaves much of humanity ‘beyond the 
pale under the general principles of morality [and] excluded from the reign of law’.338 
Instead, ‘civilised men organised in a definite territory under a sovereign government 
do not need to beg admission to international society; their State has ipso facto, by 
virtue of its mere existence, rights and duties, and, therefore, personality in the domain 
of International Law’.339  
 Williams’ endorsement of an automatic right to recognition here turns towards 
naturalistic, cosmopolitan arguments to counter fixation on the state. Williams 
believes that international law also incorporates an element beyond consent in the 
‘general opinion of civilised mankind’.340 By avoiding being ‘hypnotised by the 
contemplation of states alone’ and acknowledging they are but one form of human 
organisation, it seems impossible that legal principle would allow ‘even a majority of 
States to deny to human beings, not their subjects, fulfilling the necessary conditions 
of civilised government, the right to enter international society.’341 Institutional 
constraints, however, prevent this from occurring. Williams acknowledges that as 
much as he would prefer collective decisions along the lines examined above, absent 
the US and the USSR, the League cannot yet act as the central organ for recognition, 
and the question ‘still remains the affair of individual States’.342 Once the League is 
actually all-inclusive, ‘we shall have again a central authority, better equipped and 
with a more regular authority than the old Concert of Europe, which will say the last 
word on any question of recognition of a new State.’343 
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  In his writings of the 1930s, Williams’ vision for recognition as an instrument 
of inter-state equality expanded to include the role of ensuring peace. The 1929 paper 
was given just after the signing of the Kellogg–Briand Pact, which outlawed war as an 
instrument of national policy; at the beginning of the Chaco War between Bolivia and 
Paraguay; and just prior to the challenges to the League’s authority that emerge with 
Manchuria and Abyssinia.344 In 1932 Williams returned to the Grotius Society to 
examine the League’s adoption of the Stimson Doctrine, which provided that any 
‘situation, treaty or agreement’ that is contrary to another treaty (including the 
Covenant) would not be ‘recognised’, and the legality of any claimed title or right 
would be ‘barred’.345 Though Stimson’s announcement was spurred by the immediate 
dispute between China and Japan in Manchuria, the League’s endorsement meant it 
now formed a new general principle.  
 In his 1929 paper, Williams noted that recognition had reached a level of 
urgency in the ‘agitated times’ after the Great War—namely because of the raft of new 
states formed out of the ruins of four collapsed empires—and ‘may well involve some 
fundamentals as to the whole conception of International Law which is to prevail in 
the modern world’.346 By 1932, recognition had developed into ‘an engine of a 
hitherto unexpected potency’, that might bring into effect the outlawing of war more 
so than the declaration of that intention.347 Addressing the ‘root problem’ of 
international relations—‘the establishment of some process of peaceful change’ to deal 
with inevitable conflicts348—Williams noted that war’s usual role in effecting change 
would require a substitute: 
 
Now, if ‘recognition’ is to play the part which the new [Stimson] doctrine would assign it, and if (what 
is essential) it can be regulated by some central authority, we have in it a new method of approaching 
this problem of change, and we may find that we have taken a big step towards the organisation of a 
central control over the actions of individual States.349 
 
Williams’ correspondence contains several expressions of his lack of faith in the 
Kellogg–Briand Pact: ‘I looked at the suggestion of the “outlawry of war” rather 
sceptically. I doubted, and still doubt at times, whether the idea had been fully thought 
out’.350 Nonetheless, he hoped that the Stimson Doctrine, if it proved to be a well-
defined and agreed-upon approach to recognition applied by the League entirely, 
might indeed regulate political changes. In Williams’ view, this new wide meaning of 
recognition was ‘a large but not illogical development of the use of the term 
“recognition”’.351 But absent an international tribunal with a respected capacity to 
pronounce on the ‘legality’ or otherwise of a situation, treaty or agreement—which 
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ultimately required the ‘supremacy of law in the widest sense in international 
affairs’—we remain ‘groping our way’ towards peace.352 Williams returns again to 
civilisation, but as an indictment: the Stimson Doctrine could only work if we had 
indeed ‘arrived at the stage of civilisation at which the general sense of civilised 
mankind can make itself respected, by economic action or otherwise, without resorting 
to war, or to violence practically indistinguishable from war in its manifestations but 
not in its legal results’.353 Williams repeats his 1929 appeal to humanity, which by 
1932 would have seemed all the more urgently in danger. 
 Williams’ major work on recognition culminates in his 1933 Hague Academy 
course, undoubtedly his deepest and broadest inquiry into the history, theory and 
practice of recognition. Williams begins in a new place, and indeed one of conceptual 
history: the etymology of the word ‘recognition’ in its ‘proper and original sense’ and 
the act to which it refers. In everyday language, it is the ‘act by which a known quality 
is recognised and admitted for the first time as appertaining to a thing or a person’.354 
In a second sense, recognition attaches to status, such as that of a friend.355 In an 
‘ordinary’ legal sense—in domestic and international law alike—it may form part of a 
ceremony of legal importance: ‘the acceptance, by a person having the law to be 
consulted, of a pretension to a title or quality’.356 Williams’ example here is a 
typically English one: the coronation ceremony of a new English monarch, in which 
the monarch ‘pretends to a title, the English people admit the monarch to that title, and 
thus recognise the pretension’.357 The relevance of these meanings for international 
law, according to Williams, is to illuminate the nature of this act in international law. 
Quoting Lorimer’s dictum that recognition is the ‘foundation of international law’, 
Williams states that ‘recent developments assign to it a role of capital importance in 
international relations’.358 His concept of recognition shifts closer to its consequences 
in strengthening the reach of law across the world: 
 
One must never forget that recognition is an international process by which one submits the actions of a 
State, independently of its own will, to an external authority. It is a process based on the existence of an 
international society and the legitimate interest that each State has in some aspects of the conduct of 
other States. Thus it is a process in which it is normal to search for a means of reinforcing the 
observation of norms of international law.359 
 
 Williams’ Hague Lectures show a depth of new research. He draws on a range 
of jurists and world events to chart changes in thinking about recognition, before 
moving to argue that today’s international lawyers ought to give recognition a ‘more 
modest role, a function better suited to its etymological origins’ and its history, and 
contending that the constitutive view’s emphasis on recognition’s ‘affirmation of 
                                                 
352 Ibid, 117–23. 
353 Ibid, 129. 
354 JF Williams, ‘La Doctrine de la Reconnaissance en Droit International et ses Développements 
Récents’ (1933) 44 Recueil des Cours 198, 206. 
355 Ibid. 
356 Ibid, 206–207. 
357 Ibid, 208. 
358 Ibid, 209. 
359 Ibid. 
 objective fact’ runs against history and any satisfactory theory of ‘human relations’ 
regulated by international law.360 Since international law is ‘for the moment’ focused 
on the state as its subject, the mere prior existence of earlier states does not confer on 
them the power to determine which communities do in fact merit the status.361 Rather, 
recognition should be seen as the procedure by which states, ‘in their capacity as 
representatives of the community of the whole of civilised mankind, accept the fact 
that other men, their equals, have organised themselves into a permanent body 
endowed with international rights and duties’.362 Williams again strongly disavows 
the idea that current states enjoy any particular status, particularly to decide on what is 
civilised. 
 Williams’ post-1933 works condense and recap preceding writings, and begin 
to acknowledge that recognition could not live up to the promise it held for him. A 
1934 article extends some new ideas,363 but is mostly notable as a distillation of his 
final positions.364 Williams then does not publish anything further on recognition until 
a 1939 essay, ‘Aspects of International Law’, which restates his positions in concise 
form with additional thoughts on the tension between law and policy.365 In this short 
treatment, Williams’ language shifts to failures. Recognition’s ‘fundamental 
weakness’ as a criterion of existence or legitimacy is that it is an ‘uncontrolled 
individual act of a single state or body of states’, and consequently it relates to facts 
and ‘not of the legitimacy of a fact’.366 Incoherence results from a lack of legal rules 
and the absence of a ‘central organism of international law’.367 If Williams’ 
longstanding conviction that the hardest problem faced by international law and the 
international community alike—of how to avoid war while giving effect to changes in 
international relationships—could be solved, it was increasingly clear that the solution 
could not, in the end, be found in a theory of recognition. 
 
B. Baty: recognition in service of canon-respecting states 
 
Thomas Baty (1868–1954) remains one of the most intriguing—if largely forgotten—
figures in British international legal history.368 Completing his studies at Oxford then 
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Cambridge in 1903, Baty wrote extensively on a wide range of topics in international 
law and taught throughout Britain. Following an unsuccessful bid for the Chichele 
Professorship at Oxford in 1910, he became legal adviser to the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry in 1916. He remained in Japan for the rest of his life, save for three short trips 
to Europe, gradually gaining extensive influence in the Foreign Ministry, and most 
notably formulating Japan’s legal justifications for its actions in Manchuria. Baty’s 
many works rest on a longstanding conviction in a simple naturalism that saw 
international law as a set of axiomatic ‘canons’.369 Baty understood these canons to 
contain the true basis of the law of nations, and considered the refusal by international 
lawyers and statesmen to act in accordance with them—particularly in abrogating 
them through the consensual agreement that forms the focus of positivism—to lie at 
the root of all problems of international society. International cooperation, he thought, 
could amount to little without adherence to these principles.370 By the 1930s Baty 
directly calls for a return to natural law thinking in the mould of Grotius, thus taking a 
direction far removed from the attempts by Williams and Lauterpacht to reconcile 
positivist and naturalist thinking.371 As Carty notes, Baty’s self-understanding of the 
role of the international lawyer—to seek and clarify the general principles of law 
within the common consciousness of mankind—focused not on ‘institutional 
utterances, but more to the mentalities of leaders and world society’, and was thus 
aligned with the founding philosophies of the Institut de Droit International.372 With 
an eclectic and polemical writing style, Baty—perhaps better than any other British 
jurist—represents a distilled last gasp of British nineteenth-century natural law 
thought. His positions and overall philosophy jar clearly with ‘mainstream’ views and 
modes of argumentation in the era, and indeed even in the 1920s he must have seemed 
a relic of a bygone age.373. 
 Baty is the first British jurist to publish on recognition in the interwar period. 
A 1921 article, ‘So-Called “De Facto” Recognition’, contended that the distinction 
between simple and de facto recognition (that is, of a belligerent) rests on a 
misapprehension.374 Here, Baty introduces a concept of recognition that, consistent 
with his focus on canonical principles, barely relies on any appeal to what states do or 
have done, or criteria of statehood. If an area is under an authority that is factually 
obeyed, and that is not threatened by any other would-be sovereigns, then ‘that district 
is a state, and the authority is its sovereign’.375 Supremacy is the only test, and 
international law is ‘superbly careless’ of any constitutional, moral or legal right to 
break from a former sovereign’s control.376 While the question of supremacy as an 
issue of fact is not always ‘easy’ to decide, the decision itself is ‘simple’: ‘a favourable 
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 decision is termed recognition’.377 Recognition does not constitute the state, but it 
forms the best evidence of its existence, and can be achieved in a range of ways.378 
Baty disavows any fixed, substantive criteria and criticises the importation of obvious 
political and ideological preferences into the criteria for recognition: 
 
Nor can one state, or any combination of states, refuse this recognition to a new state or to the new 
government of an old one simply because it is autocratic or democratic, protectionist or proletarian, 
heathen or Christian—in other words, because it does not agree with it or does not like it.379 
 
Such a refusal, absent a threat to peace and safety, is a serious international offence. 
Recognition cannot be conditional or bargained but must be unqualified and complete. 
Moreover, there is no special status for the Great Powers as superior granters of 
recognition or as arbiters or representatives of a standard of civilisation. All that is 
required is the fact of cohesion and territorial control. While those facts might be 
difficult or debateable, there can be no middle ground: ‘International law knows of no 
chrysalis states.’380 Consequently, the term ‘de facto’ is a misnomer because ‘it is 
precisely the fact of [the belligerent’s] state-hood which is in suspense. What is 
recognized is simply the fact of their temporary cohesion and momentary 
independence of control’.381  
 This introduces two central themes in Baty’s concept of recognition: the 
impermanence of specific states, and the view that nation-states in general are only a 
contingent focus for current international law. After examining a range of nineteenth-
century insurrections and diplomatic communications on recognising new 
revolutionary regimes, Baty suggests that this practice is erroneously grounded on the 
perceived endurance of particular states: 
 
Much current popular talk proceeds on the footing that a state endures always and for ever, whether it 
has a settled government or not. Such a position is unknown to all the authorities on the law of nations. 
If a nation ceases to have a government, it ceases ipso facto to be a state.382 
 
The reverse of Baty’s clear principle here is that governments remain 
recognised until ‘finally reduced to impotence’: to hold otherwise would destroy ‘the 
very basis of confidence and state security’ and promote the ‘fundamentally anarchic 
principle’ that belligerents might attain some ‘indefinite share’ of powers in dealing 
with foreign states.383 Baty’s views on the impermanence of states, and the potential 
for change and division, flow from his focus on the relation between territory and 
authority. A partly successful rebellion can divide a state, and if belligerents can 
establish an authority that ‘makes its will respected in any fraction of the territory, in a 
reasonably permanent fashion, we have a sovereign state’.384 While Baty concedes 
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that assessing that will and permanence contains ‘enormous’ difficulties, the principles 
on which it is based—‘the simplicity, clearness, certainty, and stability’ of the rules of 
international law—will only be complicated or departed from by charlatan states.385 
 It is in the early- to mid-1930s in the wake of the Manchuria crisis—
throughout which Baty had been a principal legal adviser to the Japanese Foreign 
Ministry—that Baty returns to recognition. In the Canons of International Law (1930), 
Baty declared that the de jure/de facto distinction has thrown the idea of recognition 
into chaos and that accepting constitutivism would exacerbate that chaos: international 
law’s ‘simple and objective system’ requires that a state exist or not, and that opinions 
of others, whether correct or incorrect, do not alter that fact.386 In the mid-1930s, he 
reiterated the major points articulated in the early 1920s and repeated in Canons, 
though now in the context of a League under challenge and reeling from the 
Manchuria and Abyssinia crises: 
 
We shall take recognition to mean, what all will agree that it means, the expressly or implicitly 
announced opinion entertained by an existing State that a certain community has come to constitute a 
State also. … this recognition cannot be conditional, revocable or in the long run avoidable. If a State is 
a State, it remains a State whatever it does; whether it pays its debts or not, and whether it has an 
efficient police or not. It cannot be a State on condition of good behavior. If a State is acknowledged to 
be a State, it is futile afterwards to say that the acknowledgment is withdrawn. It cannot be a State at 
will. For it would not be an independent State at all. It is inconsistent with the very idea of a State that 
its existence should be wholly dependent on the option of another. And, sooner or later, the two 
communities will come into contact, and the old State cannot refuse to treat the new State as such 
without exactly the same shock to the universal consciousness as occurs when rights are refused to a 
recognized State.387 
 
 This reflects Baty’s sharp, factual approach. Elsewhere, Baty argued that 
international legitimacy differed clearly from constitutional legitimacy, as ‘simply the 
legitimate right to rule, conferred by the fact of having ruled’.388 Reinforcing facts, 
Baty concluded that recognition is ‘based on a severely realist and wholesome 
principle, namely, that those who have the rule in fact shall have the rights and 
responsibility of rule’.389 And while neighbouring states might try to subvert 
governments or re-establish a ‘broken empire’ as a suspended state, these projects are 
not legal claims but mere aspirations to what might be achieved in fact.390  
 While at this point Manchuria is not explicitly mentioned, it is clear that it—
and the criticisms of the League that go with it—lie close to the surface of Baty’s 
work. Baty uses the same language as Williams in linking recognition to the ‘close 
corporation’ but from a position of exclusion and after Japan’s exit. He writes that the 
‘heretical doctrine’ that recognition can be ‘contradicted by words’ and is a ‘pure 
favor’ probably lies in ‘the theory that the family of States is a close corporation, into 
which no new member can be admitted without the arbitrary consent of those which 
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 exist’.391 Statesmen, Baty writes, are attempting to ‘destroy’ the principle that the fact 
of independence and recognition by others makes a ‘fully-fledged State for all 
purposes, whether the States which have been compelled to show that they admit its 
existence like it or not’.392 
 Baty’s arguments disclose a clear scepticism about the kinds of political 
agendas that states might use to criticise or modify the legal principles underlying 
recognition. Like Lauterpacht below, Baty’s concept of recognition seeks to curtail 
those policy options. But a central problem remained that Japan was alone in its view 
of the ‘facts’ of anarchy in Manchuria and a lack of Chinese governmental control in 
the area. It responded to that opposition by simply leaving the League. In his memoirs, 
Baty remarks of Manchuria and Japan’s exit that it ‘had always been obvious to me 
that a distant, different and inarticulate state like Japan would be at a great 
disadvantage in the League … It would have been better to have remained outside’.393 
While for the members that remained Japan’s exit was read as a refusal to submit to 
law, Baty saw it as simply Western inability to accept the facts of a lack of authority or 
control by China over Manchuria,394 and more broadly to properly appreciate what the 
canons of international law demanded.  
 While Baty’s dedication to Japan is plain from 1916 onwards,395 we can 
perhaps discern early versions of these theoretical positions in works predating his 
Japanese appointment, particularly his criticism of the centrality of nation-states and 
his use of the example of China as an unstable nation.396 But as an adviser to a 
relatively new Great Power, and in scholarly works that are occasionally put forward 
as an explanation of Japan’s reactions to European powers, Baty’s views on 
international law and his criticisms of European arguments have a ‘new world’ bite.397 
In one sense, Baty represents older European ideas coming back to haunt and 
challenge the arguments of newer interwar theorists who saw themselves as looking to 
positivism, formalism and institutions to prevent what they took to be the excesses that 
caused the War. Somewhat ironically, Baty’s concept of recognition and the older 
natural law arguments that undergird it are deployed by the ‘new’ state of Japan to 
frustrate and undermine a project of European international cooperation: Baty and 
Japan held closely to the language of anarchy, the incapacity to control territory, and 
ideas referred to by jurists like Westlake to deny statehood and recognition to native 
tribes. 
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 C. Lauterpacht: recognition in service of community and international law itself 
 
As has been widely acknowledged, Hersch Lauterpacht (1897–1960) was one of the 
most prominent and influential British international law jurists of the twentieth 
century.398 In contrast to Williams and Baty, Lauterpacht was younger by thirty years, 
a naturalised British subject born in Poland, Jewish,399 educated not at Oxford or 
Cambridge but in Vienna under Hans Kelsen and then at the London School of 
Economics under McNair. Consequently, Lauterpacht combined the continental and 
British traditions of law and theory—taught in both cases by a pre-eminent figure in 
those traditions—and worked primarily as an academic. Lauterpacht is commonly 
regarded as an idealistic, progressive thinker who nonetheless understood the 
importance of thoroughly understanding the concrete realities of the interwar world. 
Lauterpacht’s early theoretical work is dedicated to demonstrating the moral 
possibilities of a world functioning through law and principle rather than power or 
arbitrary decision-making, in which all disputes or questions were justiciable and any 
and all purportedly ‘political’ acts could be restrained through law.400 Lauterpacht’s 
conception of law is profoundly and fundamentally German, despite his adopted 
affinity for British methods.401 Departing slightly from his teacher Kelsen,402 
Lauterpacht held that the methods of deduction and system-building must pay heed to 
the facts of the international community if law is to function: state practice ought to be 
invoked as evidence of consent where it accords with an understanding of the general 
principles of international law.403 But, consistent with the new expansion of judicial 
decisions on international law, in particular by the new Permanent Court of 
International Justice, a central question preoccupying Lauterpacht was the nature of 
justiciability of questions of international law and the purported division between law 
and policy, which he critiqued carefully in his promotion of law over policy.404 
 These aspects of method and ideology are reflected in Lauterpacht’s concept 
of recognition. Lauterpacht’s focused thinking on recognition began in 1937 following 
a prompting from McNair to prepare a new monograph.405 The text was completed by 
1939, but due to the Second World War it could not be published as a monograph until 
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 1947; in the meantime, parts appeared in journals.406 Lauterpacht’s extensive writings 
defend a mixed constitutive/declaratory concept that he contended reflected both the 
general principles of international law and the actual practice of states:  
 
To recognize a community as a State is to declare that it fulfills the conditions of statehood as required 
by international law. If these conditions are present, existing States are under the duty to grant 
recognition. In the absence of an international organ competent to ascertain and authoritatively to 
declare the presence of requirements of full international personality, States already established fulfill 
that function in their capacity as organs of international law. In thus acting they administer the law of 
nations. This rule of law signifies that in granting or withholding recognition States do not claim and are 
not entitled to serve exclusively the interests of their national policy and convenience regardless of the 
principles of international law in the matter. Although recognition is thus declaratory of an existing fact, 
such declaration, made in the impartial fulfillment of a legal duty, is constitutive, as between the 
recognizing State and the new community, of international rights and duties associated with full 
statehood. Prior to recognition such rights and obligations exist only to the extent to which they have 
been expressly conceded or legitimately asserted by reference to compelling rules of humanity and 
justice, either by the existing members of international society or by the community claiming 
recognition.407 
  
 The foundation here is an ‘international social reality’ that exists and furnishes 
the facts that states interpret. But that interpretation always occurs through principles 
of international law. This social reality has been shorn of all civilisational criteria. 
Lauterpacht insisted that international law generally—and recognition specifically—
no longer distinguished between civilised and uncivilised states or held certain states 
to be outside an international community of civilised states.408 
 In a footnote to a co-authored work on recognition, Lauterpacht addresses 
prevailing views quite candidly. Lauterpacht’s disagreement with the ‘majority’ of 
international lawyers is that they treated ‘aspects of recognition, connected as they are 
with fundamental manifestations of the life of States … largely from the political and 
diplomatic rather than the legal point of view’ and consequently they do not associate 
facts with legal criteria or duties.409 Rather, the ‘more accurate view’ is that 
‘conditions of fact identical with conditions of statehood as laid down in international 
law gives rise, respectively, to the right to recognition as a State and to the duty of 
recognition on the part of existing States’.410 Facts are to be read through legal 
conditions, giving rise to a correlative right and duty of recognition.  
 Koskenniemi’s reading of Lauterpacht is illuminating for understanding the 
place of his concept of recognition within his broader project. Lauterpacht turns to 
international cooperative processes to exit the ‘circle of interpretative problems’ which 
was the problem of modern law: that facts are required to constrain political will, but 
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facts must also themselves be interpreted.411 Lauterpacht sought to do this by 
articulating and defending a faith that diplomatic practice in accordance with 
international law within a democratic international organisation could regularise these 
diplomatic debates about facts underlying recognition.412 As other commentators 
pointed out at the time, the formalisation of recognition criteria into application 
requirements for admission to the League had made these debates extremely confusing 
and often combative.413 But as Koskenniemi concludes, ‘Lauterpacht’s utopia was not 
unworkable because diplomats were unwilling to imagine themselves as judges but 
because, to judge wisely, they needed to be good diplomats!’.414   
 Lauterpacht’s recognition is a final rumination on what might have been 
achieved in the interwar period if only law, diplomacy and the concrete international 
social reality could have brought into proper contact. By 1937, the excesses of national 
policy in Manchuria, Abyssinia and Spain and the apparent inevitability of a new war 
with Germany confirm that the League and its legal framework had failed. But for 
Lauterpacht it is a failure of framework, not of law itself, and that failure does not 
undermine the possibility that states’ adherence to law might still deliver peace and 
stability. For Lauterpacht, the context of failure is seemingly beside the point. Law is 
the selection and interpretation of facts, and, while the recurring deep conflict in legal 
theory between law and fact may not be soluble, the way forward is acceptance that 
recognition involves legal interpretation. States will continue to dispute and disagree; 
but when they do it will be about questions of law, not of policy or interest. Like Baty 
and Williams, Lauterpacht’s scepticism about formalism’s narrow focus on state 
conduct was based in his conviction that general principles underlie international law 
as a system. But unlike Baty’s refusal to bring his canonical principles into contact 
with the concrete international situation, or Williams’ rather simplistic appeals to 
civilisation, Lauterpacht’s more nuanced appeal to general principles forms a much 
clearer reinforcement for his concept of recognition. A post-war order might cling 
better to law and promote the interests of individuals, the self-determination of 
political communities, international cooperation and lawfulness, rather than only the 
policy preferences of states.415 If Williams showed recognition’s urgency and 
possibilities, and Baty demonstrated why it could not work, Lauterpacht both reminds 
us why it failed even as he urges us to maintain our faith in the possibilities of 
international law.  
 
D. Recognition as a basic concept in international law 
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 Rather than exploring the heavy critical reception Lauterpacht’s theory received,416 I 
conclude this section by considering how Lauterpacht, Baty, and Williams’ works 
demonstrate recognition’s emergence as a basic concept. In these writings, recognition 
has attained the status of a concept central to the making of international legal 
arguments. Each author offers a concept of recognition that incorporates a temporal 
aspect of wider philosophical, historical and teleological narratives about law and its 
place in international society; albeit with very different narratives. Each author reflects 
and suggests recognition’s relevance in broader discussions beyond jurists alone, in 
the work of international bureaucrats, domestic politicians and members of the public. 
In each case, the concept of recognition holds a central place in wider ideological and 
political projects, including equality, the removal of civilisational criteria, peace, the 
role of the state, cooperation through international law, and ultimately the nature of 
international law itself. And the concrete facts used in each theory reflect the use of 
recognition throughout the interwar period by antagonistic political actors to further 
their ends. It is, above all, fundamentally contested and contains a range of meanings 
capable of being pressed to serve many projects. 
 Each of these jurists conceptualised recognition as an argument about the 
application of principles of international law. This lies in stark contrast to the 
diplomatic focus of the first strand of recognition theories and the chauvinist racism of 
Lorimer, and is far more advanced than the often haphazard mix of diplomatic practice 
with political, social and legal principles that began to emerge in the discussions of the 
late colonial era. Williams, Baty and Lauterpacht each reflect some resistance to and 
critique of the hierarchies of political communities that their predecessor jurists had 
contributed to constructing. Nonetheless, they each held their own ideologies of what 
international society ought to look like, and how recognition specifically—and 
international law generally—could ameliorate the damage that the development of the 
international legal order had wrought so far. Their concepts of recognition differ so 
starkly partly because of the differences in their political projects, and those 
differences are tragically clarified, too, by the ultimate inability of lawyers or 
politicians to achieve the radical expectations these jurists placed upon international 
law. But in their attempts, these works reflect recognition’s attainment of the status of 
a basic concept of international law: an account of the nature of states, the 
requirements and nature of admission to international society, and the modes and legal 
principles allowing or constraining decisions on recognition, all of which are 
fundamental to their wider arguments about international society, and projects for its 
improvement through law.  
 
VII. CONCLUSION: RECOGNITION AS A BASIC CONCEPT BY THE 1950S 
 
Although new British works on the concept of recognition begin to wane in the 
decades after Lauterpacht’s monograph,417 works after 1950 by Chen, Fitzmaurice 
and Schwarzenberger show the entrenchment of declaratory and constitutive theories 
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of recognition, alongside candid acknowledgements of the divisive and political nature 
of recognition. These writings appear in a world in which the British Empire is fast 
dissolving, and in which discourses of international law are about to move from 
recognition to self-determination and decolonisation as the avenues to sovereignty, 
statehood and membership of the international community. Recognition debates did 
not cease after 1950. They held — and still hold — clear political significance in 
contests over disputed territories, intellectual or otherwise. Rather the 1950s succinctly 
illustrates how those debates settle, somewhat, into the diametric doctrinal oppositions 
of declarative and constitutive that we know today. The lead-up to decolonisation also 
shows how political projects in international law begin to shift in different directions, 
away from recognition. 
 When Lauterpacht’s work appeared, Ti-Chiang Chen was in the ‘final stage’ 
of preparing his doctoral thesis at Oxford under the supervision of Brierly.418 While 
Chen had returned to China by the time The International Law of Recognition 
appeared in 1951, Chen’s work can be read as thoroughly ‘British’ by his training, 
Brierly’s influence and his choice of British and United States case law. Chen argued, 
contra Lauterpacht, that constitutive arguments logically entail a denial of the 
obligatory character of international law and, further, are inconsistent with state and 
judicial practice, illustrated by Britain and the United States.419 Opening the book, 
Chen refers to the fundamental contestation, and political aspects, of the concept of 
recognition. He writes that recognition ‘is but a reflection of the fundamental 
cleavage’ between those who see states as the ‘ultimate source’ of international law, 
and those who take states to be subject to a system of law already determining their 
rights and duties.420 Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice’s 1957 Hague Academy lectures 
judiciously weighed the declarative and constitutive views, concluding with support 
for the declaratory position.421 Partly this is because the old club of nations is now 
seen to cover the earth. Fitzmaurice said that international society now embraces 
‘virtually all territories and all peoples ... no longer like a club which is joined, but like 
a clan or family into which persons are born’.422 In ‘almost any case that can happen 
to-day’ peoples claiming recognition will ‘previously or already have been’ be 
members of a community that, ‘either in itself or as part of a wider unit’, held full 
international statehood.423 Chen and Fitzmaurice here each reflect aspects of the 
entrenchment of recognition as a basic concept in international legal thought. For 
Chen, positions on recognition reflect a ‘fundamental cleavage’ between two opposed 
camps. In Fitzmaurice’s work the views of those camps are neatly and expertly 
dissected. By the 1950s the international legal world now covers the entirety of the 
globe. There are no more newcomers that do not merely emerge from already 
recognised bodies, and no more civilisations to explicitly exclude. The concept of 
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 recognition in their works is both fundamentally disputed and central to projects of 
international legal argument.  
 This basicness is most vividly illuminated by Georg Schwarzenberger’s 
comments at the Hague Academy in 1955 on recognition’s ‘controversial aspects’—
which, like Chen, he also termed ‘deep cleavage[s]’: 
 
To anybody who looks with some detachment at any of the warring eclectic doctrines, it must look as if 
such forthright response to apparently strong provocation indicated the existence of issues deeper than 
differences in method and interpretation of ambivalent material. In order to understand the temperature 
of such doctrinal clashes, it is necessary to examine the political functions which, voluntarily or 
involuntarily, any particular doctrine serves or is made to serve. In this context ... the temperature of the 
doctrinal clashes in this field alone appears to make out a strong prima facie case for the sociological 
analysis of the Doctrine of international law.424 
 
To Schwarzenberger, this combination of divisions within and between concepts of 
recognition, and the acknowledgement of the clear political functions they served, is 
grounds enough to make a sociological analysis of these doctrines and their authors—
the non- or extra-legal factors like political projects, social communities and lives—
seem worth pursuing.425 This account of competing views on the concept of 
recognition, linked to political projects and argued within a clear community of 
interlocutors accords entirely with its status as a basic concept in international law.  
 When Chen’s work appeared the beginning of the end of the British Empire 
was already clear, and by the time Fitzmaurice spoke in The Hague, it had undeniably 
come to pass. The dissolution of the Empire combined with the advent of the Cold 
War and impending decolonisation, significantly contributed to and changed the state 
of international law and the problem of recognition that Fitzmaurice describes. 
Between the partition of India and withdrawal from Palestine in 1947, the 
independence of Burma, Ceylon and Egypt, and the Suez Crisis of 1956, British policy 
under MacMillan moved from 1957 onwards to gradual acceptance of the reality that 
the Empire could no longer be maintained ; economically, militarily or politically.426 
With the post-war centrality of the United Nations, the theoretical quandaries of the 
nature of recognition were soon partly overlayed by new focus on admission to 
membership of the United Nations.427 By 1956 the ‘logjam’ of states that had sought 
admission but were precluded because of Cold War political struggles had cleared, 
paving the way for the universality of the United Nations and effectively removing the 
substantive admission criteria written into article 4 of the UN Charter.428 And by the 
1960s, the language and political projects of international law had shifted towards 
decolonisation, self-determination, independence, and the accession of colonial 
territories to sovereign status. In contrast to the interwar period, ‘these territories 
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staked their requests for foreign acknowledgement not on the basis of having attained 
de facto statehood, but on the inadmissibility of their second-class rank in the family 
of nations’.429 Many practising British international lawyers, newly integrated within 
the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, turned their attentions to new projects of 
international law, and disputes before the new International Court of Justice.430 While 
the demise of the British Empire certainly was not the sole cause of this state of 
affairs, it aptly encapsulates both the new international social reality that drastically 
reduced the urgency and significance of disputes about the concept of recognition in 
the post-war order, and one important set of reasons for that reality coming to pass, 
particularly in paving the way for the new centrality of the United Nations General 
Assembly in the move to decolonisation, with its foundational concept of self-
determination. 
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